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It is a very commonplace truth that before discussing anything,
it is well to define the object of the discussion. Without this ele-
mentary precaution, the disputants run the risk of talking a
great deal without advancing a single step, and of tearing out
each others' hair when as a matter of fact they really agree. This
is universally known, but seldom taken into account, at least in
practical life.
In juridical life, definitions were for long periods dispensed
with. Even some highly developed and subtle legal works pre-
suppose that everybody knows what they are talking about, and
give no explanation of the most complex ideas. In other periods,
quite the contrary, the definition dominates juridical science. It
is discovered in the writings of the legislator and the judge as
well as in those of the jurist. Its function is no longer simply to
clarify debate. It has become an active factor in the formation of
law. It suggests to legal practice solutions which appear incon-
testable. It directs the progress of the law . .. .
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to be copyrightable, a work must be "original," and, in
fact, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[tihe
sine qua non of copyright is originality."'2 The Copyright Act of
19763 explicitly requires originality, 4 and the Supreme Court has
1. PIERRE DE TOURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 327-28 (Martha
McC. Read trans., 1922).
2. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991). The Feist
Court expressly recognized that "[t]o qualify for copyright protection, a work must be origi-
nal to the author." Id. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556 (1985)). The Court forcefully added that "[t]he originality requirement . . . re-
mains the touchstone of copyright protection" and that "[i]t is the very 'premise of copy-
right law.' " Id. at 1288 (citations omitted); see 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §§ 1.2.2.3,
2.2.1 (1989); MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW §§ 2.7-.11 (1989); 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01, 2.05[D], 2.08[A][3],
[B], (C][21, [E], [GI[3], 2.10[A][21, 3.03-.04 (1992) [hereinafter NIMMER].
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
4. The Copyright Act states that "[c]opyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship .... " Id. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
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held that the Constitution itself established the originality require-
ment.5 However, because neither the Copyright Act6 nor the
courts7 has defined copyright originality in a clear manner, there
remains today a blurred vision of what the term "originality"
5. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288. The Court asserted:
Originality is a constitutional requirement. The source of Congress' power to
enact copyright laws is Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution, which autho-
rizes Congress to "secur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings." In two decisions from the late 19th Cen-
tury-The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); and Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)-this Court defined the crucial terms
"authors" and "writings." In so doing, the court made it unmistakably clear
that these terms presuppose a degree of originality.
Id. (parallel citations omitted). The Court added that Professors Patterson and Joyce had
made the point by succinctly stating that" '[t]he originality requirement is constitutionally
mandated for all works."' Id. (quoting L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the
Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36
UCLA L. REv. 719, 763 n.155 (1989)).
One commentator has summarized the origins of originality as follows:
There has been much theorizing about the legal genealogy of the requirement
of originality. The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution has been cited as
the earliest ancestor under two theories. [Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution
grants the power to Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."] One theory holds that the
phrase "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" requires that a
work contain some substantial originality in order to receive copyright protec-
tion. The second theory holds that the use of the term "authors" requires a
modicum of originality, at least more than the mere copying of public domain
materials. Whatever its genealogy, it is beyond question that an "original work
of authorship" is required by the 1976 Act.
David C. Stimson, Note, Factual Compilations-Copyright Protection for Compilation De-
pends on Degree of Originality Involved in Assembling Facts-Financial Information, Inc.
v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 1, 14-15 (1985) (footnotes
omitted).
6. Congress deliberately left the term "originality" undefined in the Copyright Act of
1976 in order to engraft the standard of originality established by judicial decisions under
the 1909 Act. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976); see 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 2, §§ 1.2.2.1, 1.2.2.3, 2.2.1, at 65 n.15; LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 2.7[A]; 1 NIMMER, supra
note 2, § 2.01; Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 Mo. L. REv. 29, 31 (1983).
7. As this Article demonstrates, courts have fashioned numerous definitions and legal
tests for originality. However, the inconsistencies and impracticalities of those judge-made
definitions render them virtually useless. One commentator has observed that "courts have
yet to agree upon a universal test of originality to be applied in all cases." Alan T. Dworkin,
Originality in the Law of Copyright, 39 B.U. L. REv. 526, 526 (1959), reprinted in 11 Copy-
RIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 60, 60 (1962).
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means in copyright law.8 In addition to failing to provide an ade-
quate definition of originality, Congress and the courts have failed
to offer meaningful standards for determining when a work is origi-
nal. This Article aspires to bring that definition into sharper focus
and to offer some explanations of useful and pragmatic standards
that may be applied in evaluating copyright originality.
One underlying theme that this Article advances is that the fun-
damental concept of copyright originality ought to be much sim-
pler than courts treat it presently. Many have proposed that origi-
nality is a relative concept that has different meanings depending
upon the nature of the work in question.9 Originality jurisprudence
8. A number of commentators have done a great deal to fill in the statutory and judicial
gaps in defining originality. Particularly useful in their analysis and-something to which
this Article does not even aspire-their explication of the broad historical evolution of origi-
nality in the law of copyright are the following: Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright
Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579 (1985); Robert C. Den-
icola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary
Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516 (1983); Dworkin, supra note 7; Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation
and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1865 (1990); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Robert A.
Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HAuv. L.
REV. 1569 (1963); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of "Au-
thorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; Beryl R. Jones, Factual Compilations and the Second Cir-
cuit, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 679 (1986); Olson, supra note 6; Gregg Oppenheimer, Originality in
Art Reproductions: "Variations" in Search of a Theme, 27 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP)
207 (1982); Leo J. Raskind, The Continuing Process of Refining and Adapting Copyright
Principles, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 125 (1990); John F. Whicher, Originality, Cartogra-
phy, and Copyright, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 280 (1963); Leon R. Yankwich, Originality in the
Law of Intellectual Property (Its Meaning from a Legal and Literary Standpoint), 11
F.R.D. 457 (1952); Brian A. Dahl, Comment, Originality and Creativity in Reporter Pagina-
tion: A Contradiction in Terms?, 74 IowA L. REV. 713 (1989); Howard Klepper, Note, Origi-
nality in Cartography: The Standard for Copyright Protection, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
469 (1980); Mitzi S. Phalen, Comment, How Much Is Enough? The Search for a Standard
of Creativity in Works of Authorship Under Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976,
68 NEB. L. REv. 835 (1989); Ronald P. Smith, Note, Arrangements and Editions of Public
Domain Music: Originality in a Finite System, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 104 (1983); Stim-
son, supra note 5; Christine Wallace, Note, Overlapping Interests in Derivative Works and
Compilations, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103 (1985);.
9. See, e.g., Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1951); 1
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, §§ 2.2.1-.2.2, 2.6-.61; LEAFFER, supra note 2, §§ 2.9[A], [D], 2.10,
2.11[A]; 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, §§ 2.01, 2.05[D], 2.08[A][3], [B], [C][2], [E], [GJ[8],
2.10[A][2], 3.03-.04; Dworkin, supra note 7, at 71-81; Gorman, supra note 8, at 1603 passim;
Yankwich, supra note 8, at 458-85; cf. Raskind, supra note 8, at 150 n.94 (noting that other
commentators have proposed "that authorship is not a unitary concept, but requires defini-
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is fraught with discussions proposing that originality means one
thing for maps, something else for photographs, and yet another
thing for music, literature, art reproductions, and so on.10 This Ar-
ticle takes an antithetic view, advocating that copyright jurispru-
dence should not unnecessarily consider originality as volatile and
contingent upon the character of the work. Rather, the definition
of originality should have one basic meaning."" This does not nec-
essarily mean that originality analysis will be simple and uncompli-
cated. In fact, this Article shows that if the courts analyze original-
ity following the principles that I suggest, they will have to
perform a more thorough and detailed analysis to determine copy-
right originality than the cursory and shallow treatment they fre-
quently have applied in the past.
It is important, at the outset, to recognize that courts have con-
strued the word "original" to have two distinct meanings for pur-
poses of copyright law. 2 First, they have ruled that "[o]riginality is
distinct from novelty. To be original, a work must be the product
tion for each category of protectable material") (emphasis added) (citing Jane C. Ginsburg,
Sabotaging and Reconstructiong [sic] History: A Comment on the Scope of Copyright Pro-
tection in Works of History After Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'v
647, 649-50 (1982)).
Professor Olson blames this subject matter approach on the "erratic development of the
principles of originality." Olson, supra note 6, at 31-32. He disapproves of the subject mat-
ter approach, characterizing it as impermissible and fragmentary, and he blames it for "the
development of originality standards that first require a subject matter classification and
then require the application of an originality standard tailored to the specific classification."
Id. at 32.
10. See Olson, supra note 6, at 32.
11. Professor Ginsburg has advocated a recognition of "low authorship" and "high au-
thorship" works. The distinction between Professor Ginsburg's types turns in part on the
status of the work in question, that is, whether it is a compilation, derivative, or freestand-
ing work. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1866-72.
We have now, as we have long had, two kinds of copyright: in high authorship
works, such as novels and narrative histories, copyright protects the authorial
presence within the work; in low authorship works, such as telephone directo-
ries and compilations of stock quotations, copyright protects the labor and re-
sources invested in the work's creation.
Id. at 1870; see also infra part II.C. (discussing freestanding works). I advocate the position
that applying a trivial/distinguishable variation standard to originality would protect both
the notion of "authorial personality" and "labor and resources." See infra part III.
12. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991); see 1
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.2.1; LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 2.07[A]; 1 NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 2.01[A]-[B].
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of independent creation.' 3 For the purposes of discussion, I shall
call this first meaning of originality-independent creation-
"Type I originality.' 1 4 For a work to be Type I original, an author
must create a work independently of other preexisting works (i.e.,
she must not have copied it from any other source-whether the
source is protected by copyright or in the public domain).
Courts also have interpreted the word "original" to contain an
additional subjective element that I call "Type II originality.' 5
13. Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Servs., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769, 771 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (cit-
ing L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 857 (1976)); see Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287 (holding that "[o]riginal ... means only that
the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works)"); Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)
("[Tihe originality required in case of copyright means little more than a prohibition of
actual copying."). See also Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924),
in which Judge Learned Hand held that "[o]ne may infringe a patent by the innocent repro-
duction of the machine patented, but the law imposes no prohibition upon those who, with-
out copying, independently arrive at the precise combination of words or [musical] notes
which have been copyrighted." See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.2.1, at 62 n.1; 2 id. §
7.2.2; LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 2.7[B].
14. In a recent article, I referred to what I now call Type I and Type II originality as
"objective originality" and "subjective originality," respectively. See Russ VerSteeg & Paul
K. Harrington, Nonobviousness as an Element of Copyrightability? (Or, Is the Jewel in the
Lotus a Cubic Zirconia?), 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 331, 375 n.168 (1992). I have realized subse-
quently that the words "objective" and "subjective" fail to add anything useful in this con-
text. If anything, they may add to the existing confusion. Thus, in this Article I adopt the
generic terms "Type I" and "Type II" in an effort to provide unbiased, nonvalue-specific
terminology.
Some of the earliest American copyright decisions crystallized the basic tenets of Type I
originality (but, of course, not the vocabulary). See, e.g., Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035
(C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728) (Story, J.); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass.
1845) (No. 4436) (Story, J.). Professor Olson notes that "Gray and Emerson established a
minimal standard of originality, emphasizing the necessity that the work . . . be indepen-
dently created." Olson, supra note 6, at 36.
15. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. "Even if a work is an independent creation
it must demonstrate a minimal amount of creative authorship." LEAFFER, supra note 2, §
2.7[C]; see also 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.2.1.2 (listing various standards for the quan-
titative threshold that creators must meet for their work to be considered original). One
commentator has described this element as follows:
"Originality" has been used to denote a separate concept [as distinguished
from Type I originality], that of intrinsic merit. This requirement is derived
from the constitutional grant of copyright power to Congress "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts." Courts have held that a work does not
promote progress unless it has some intrinsic value or usefulness. While this
quantum of merit has been variously described by terms "creativity" and "in-
tellectual labor," it is also referred to under the rubric of "originality."
Klepper, supra note 8, at 479 (citations omitted).
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This Article critically examines the two dominant formulations of
this second element that have emerged from the cases. One formu-
lation of Type II originality requires that the work exhibit "at least
some minimal degree of creativity." 16 The other model holds that
Type II originality requires a work to exhibit a "distinguishable
variation. ' 17 The leading case that forged the "distinguishable va-
16. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287; see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973)
(stating that "any physical rendering of the fruits of dreative intellectual or aesthetic labor"
would qualify as "writings" under the Constitution and would, therefore, be copyrightable)
(emphasis added). The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), represent one of the first
Court decisions to discuss the concept of creativity as an element of copyrightability. Justice
Miller, writing for the Court, stated that the Constitution's copyright protection for writings
was limited to "only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the
mind." I. at 94 (latter emphasis added). For additional discussion about the Trade-Mark
Cases and their role in the formulation of a creativity element in copyright originality, see
infra part III. Other cases have espoused a requirement of some degree of "creativity." See,
e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 n.6
(7th Cir. 1986) ("A work is creative if it embodies some modest amount of intellectual la-
bor.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987); John Muller Co. v. New York
Arrows Soccer Team, 802 F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that "a work must show
certain minimal levels of creativity") (citing Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764,
765 (8th Cir. 1973)); West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th
Cir. 1986) (asserting that "[tihe standard for 'originality' is minimal"), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1070 (1987); United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding that
the item was the product of "substantial creative efforts"); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,
536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc) ("There is implicit in that concept [i.e., originality] a
'minimal element of creativity over and above the requirement of independent effort.' ")
(quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 10.2 (1975)), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 857 (1976); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir.) (ac-
knowledging that "even a modicum of creativity may suffice for a work to be protected"),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104,
106 (3d Cir. 1951) ("In order for a map to be copyrightable its preparation must involve a
modicum of creative work."); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (D.D.C.
1988) (evaluating whether the work was "the result of the minimally required amount of
creative expression"), rev'd, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer
Contact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D.N.J. 1987) (searching for "the modicum of
creativity necessary for a work to be copyrightable"); Magic Mktg., 634 F. Supp. at 771-72
(using the phrases "minimal level of creativity necessary to warrant copyright protection,"
"sufficient degree of creativity," and "minimal degree of creativity").
There have also been instances when courts have combined a creativity standard with a
trivial/distinguishable variation standard. See Andrews v. Guenther Publishing Co., 60 F.2d
555, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
17. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (citing
Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)). As regards
derivative works, Professor Nimmer's treatise states that "[a]ny variation will not suffice,
but one which is sufficient to render the derivative work distinguishable from its prior work
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riation" standard as a method of determining Type II originality,
in any meaningful manner will be sufficient." 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.03 (footnote
omitted).
Many courts have used the term "trivial variation" somewhere in their discussion. See,
e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing
Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490). Those courts have stated that, in order to be original, the author's
variation(s) must be "more than trivial." E.g., id. Other courts have expressed the "varia-
tion" standard in terms of a "distinguishable variation," Applied Innovations, Inc. v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Minn., 876 F.2d 626, 635 (8th Cir. 1989), a "substantial variation,"
Batlin, 536 F.2d at 491, or "significant variations," DC Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1117, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Essentially, each of these articulations-"more
than trivial," "distinguishable," "substantial," and "significant"-represents an attempt to
describe a variation that is a recognizable minimum above "the trivial." Simply stated, a
variation that is "trivial" fails to yield a copyrightable result whereas a variation that'is
"substantial," "distinguishable," or "significant" (i.e., denoting a variation that is a mini-
mum quantum above trivial) does yield a copyrightable result. Although minor differences
arguably exist among these articulations of the "variation" standard, I have chosen to treat
them as functional equivalents. But see Oppenheimer, supra note 8, at 210 (suggesting that
Batlin, 536 F.2d at 491, recognized an important distinction between "distinguishable varia-
tion" and "substantial variation"). In Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.
1983), Judge Posner held that a painting, in which the artist had superimposed elements
from two movie stills from The Wizard Of Oz, was uncopyrightable. Id. at 305. Purportedly
following Batlin, he held that "a derivative work must be substantially different from the
underlying work to be copyrightable." Id. (emphasis added). Thereby Judge Posner sug-
gested a tri-level tier of analysis: trivial (noncopyrightable), just above trivial (but still
noncopyrightable), and "substantially different" (copyrightable). Id. The court in Batlin in-
deed had said: "We do follow the school of cases in this circuit and elsewhere supporting the
proposition that to support a copyright there must be at least some substantial variation,
not merely a trivial variation, such as might occur in the translation to a different medium."
Batlin, 536 F.2d at 491. Quite obviously, however, the court in Batlin used the term "sub-
stantial variation" merely to delineate a point just above "trivial," and not, as Judge Posner
suggested in Gracen, to forge a new level of variation that was copyrightable. Ironically, by
holding that the artist's paintings were unoriginal and therefore not copyrightable, Judge
Posner forever doomed the Bradford Exchange's ability to register the copyright for its com-
memorative plates fashioned from movie stills, because his ruling made such variations of
movie stills uncopyrightable. Because both Jaszi's article and Nimmer's treatise soundly and
justifiably have criticized Judge Posner's Gracen opinion, I need not belabor further that
highly suspect opinion. See Jaszi, supra note 8, at 460-62 nn.12, 19-20.
[It is true that the Batlin opinion stated:] "there must be some substantial
variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the translation
to a different medium." But this must be taken in the context of the facts of
that case, where converting a cast iron "Uncle Sam" bank into plastic form was
held not to constitute sufficient originality. Batlin did not suggest a new test
for derivative work originality. On the contrary, it relied heavily upon the
teachings of Alfred Bell, stating: "The test of originality is concededly one with
a low threshold in that 'all that is needed. . . is that the "author" contributed
something more than a "merely trivial" variation, something recognizably his
own.' "
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1 NiMMER, supra note 2, § 3.03, at 3-15 n.36. The Second Circuit recently laid the issue to
rest, stating- "In deciding whether the originality of the matter added ... is sufficient to
qualify for protection as a derivative work, the standard enunciated in [Alfred Bell] remains
the law in this Circuit." Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 883 (1989) (citations omitted). For more complete discussions of Batlin and Alfred
Bell, see infra parts III.D.1., .E.2.
A significant number of courts discussing this issue have used the phrase "distinguishable
variation." See, e.g., Applied Innovations, 876 F.2d at 635 (holding that the "revisions...
represent 'distinguishable' variations of the prior works"); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Con-
servative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1987); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews,
783 F.2d 421, 438 (4th Cir. 1986); Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 445
(2d Cir. 1960); Secure Servs. Technology, Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F.
Supp. 1354, 1362 (E.D. Va. 1989); Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347,
1352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Merritt Forbes & Co. v. Newman Invest. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp.
943, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 151
(D.N.J. 1982), afl'd, 775 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1985); M.M. Business Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc.,
347 F. Supp. 419, 425-26 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1137 (6th Cir. 1973); C.S. Ham-
mond & Co. v. International College Globe, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 206, 211-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Amplex Mfg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1960);
Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). Thus, because of the descriptive
nature of the term and because of its popularity with the judiciary, I have chosen to use
"distinguishable variation" to refer to a variation that just succeeds in clearing the hurdle of
triviality.
Although I am tempted to refer to the requirement that the variation in question be
"more than trivial" by using a new term like "supra-trivial," from the Latin supra meaning
"above," I have resisted the temptation. In Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, the court offered this
explanation:
[A] contribution which is more than merely trivial is required in order to sat-
isfy the originality requirement of the Constitution and the copyright statutes.
... When a work displays a significant element of compilation, that element
is protectible even though the individual components of the work may not be,
for originality may be found in taking the commonplace and making it into a
new combination or arrangement. Trivial elements of compilation and arrange-
ment, of course, are not copyrightable since they fall below the threshold of
originality.
Id. at 450-51 (citations omitted). For other cases using these "variation" standards, see
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d 821, 825 (11th Cir. 1982);
Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Plaintiff ... must lose
unless he has shown that his work contains some substantial, not merely trivial originality
...."); Gerlach-Barklow, 23 F.2d at 161 ("While a copy of something in the public domain
will not, if it be merely a copy, support a copyright, a distinguishable variation will. .. .");
Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1916) (using a "trivial variations"
approach). In Gross, the Second Circuit reprinted Judge Learned Hand's district court opin-
ion in its entirety. In that opinion, Judge Hand observed:
A painter, for example, often makes two pictures from the same model; but
there may be great differences between the several positions, sometimes even
between several aspects of the same position. We have nothing to do with the
beauty or originality of the artistic purpose; here it is only novelty that counts.
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Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,18 articulated the stan-
dard as follows: "All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution
and the [copyright] statute is that the 'author' contributed some-
thing more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recogniza-
bly 'his own.' "19 Because Type II originality is, by its very nature,
an elusive concept that is difficult to quantify, and because judges
generally are not adequately trained to evaluate subjective levels of
artistic merit, courts should fashion a standard that is as objective
as possible.20 If some degree of objectivity is a goal, then courts
Merely trivial variations will not distinguish, it is true; but the head and face
are not trivial elements, as, for example, the feet might be, crossed or parallel.
It seems to me, therefore, that Rochlitz [the artist] was entirely successful in
what he started out to do, and that he did make two clearly distinguishable
and independent poses of the model, each one a separate piece of artistic copy-
right, each capable of statutory copyright.
Id. at 412-13 (emphasis added). This case may contain the locus classicus of the trivial/
distinguishable variation standard. For other discussions of "trivial variation," see Gross v.
Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914); Magic Mktg., 634 F. Supp. at 771; Plymouth Music
Co. v. Magnus Organ Corp., 456 F. Supp. 676, 679-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Consolidated Music
Publishers, Inc. v. Ashley Publications, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325, 356-57 (1989); Oppenheimer, supra note 8, at 207-10; Raskind, supra note 8, at
149-63.
Lastly, the notion of a distinguishable variation in copyright law is wholly unrelated to
the patent concept of "obvious variation" used in the analysis of "double patenting" ques-
tions. See In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441-42
(C.C.P.A. 1970). One of the premier patent judges of our time, Judge Giles Rich, explained
the patent doctrine of "obvious variation" as follows:
Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicially created doctrine intended to
prevent improper timewise extension of the patent right by prohibiting the
issuance of claims in a second patent which are not "patentably distinct" from
the claims of a first patent. The doctrine has also been phrased as prohibiting
claims in the second patent which define "merely an obvious variation" of an
invention claimed in the first patent.
Braat, 937 F.2d at 592 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Vogel, 422 F.2d at 441).
18. 191 F.2d 99.
19. Id. at 102-03.
20. Most lawyers who have dealt with copyright originality are aware of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes' proverbial dictum:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At one extreme some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them re-
pulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of
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must define these terms carefully and must determine whether a
"creativity" standard or a "trivial/distinguishable variation" stan-
dard more likely will yield a practical method for evaluating Type
II originality.
In Part II, this Article advocates that, for purposes of evaluating
originality, it is necessary to categorize all works that are poten-
tially copyrightable into three classifications: 1) compilations;21 2)
derivative works;22 and 3) "freestanding works" that are neither
compilations nor derivatives. 3 I do not isolate these categories to
promote different definitions of originality that are dependent
upon the classifications. Instead, using these classifications im-
proves one's ability to judge copyright originality and enables one
to identify the substance-the raw materials-with which putative
authors begin. Part III of this Article represents an attempt to un-
tangle the often-ignored difficulties in assessing Type II originality,
by weighing the "creativity" and "trivial/distinguishable variation"
standards. Also, using some new vocabulary, Part III reexamines
three well-known and controversial cases to identify, illustrate, and
explain the subtle distinctions that must be drawn to resolve
whether any given work can be characterized as Type II original.
Part IV considers the role of Type I originality and suggests that
courts have failed to examine properly the issue of copying within
originality analysis. 24 Finally, in Part V, this Article evaluates the
Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen
for the first time.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). In his thorough explica-
tion of copyright originality, Professor Olson recognizes the difficulties inherent in a subjec-
tive assessment of originality. See Olson, supra note 6, at 32, 61. Professor Olson stresses
the importance of striving towards an objective standard: "Central to the continued confu-
sion surrounding the appropriate standard of copyright originality is the failure to select an
objective judicial standard." Id. at 32.
21. See infra text accompanying note 26 (defining "compilation"); infra. notes 27-30 and
accompanying text.
22. See infra text accompanying note 31 (defining "derivative work"); infra notes 32-33
and accompanying text.
23. The Copyright Act does not define works that are neither derivative works nor compi-
lations with the exception of "collective work[s]," which are subsumed under the definition
of compilations. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Thus, I define "freestanding
works" in the negative, as those works that are neither compilations nor derivatives. See
infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
24. One significant aspect of the originality analysis that this Article does not address
directly is procedural posture. The stage of litigation at which originality analysis is most
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analyses presented. It offers an alternative interpretation of the
often brought to bear-that is, the procedural posture of cases in which originality has been
litigated-may have had a significant impact on the outcome of many close cases. Professor
Ginsburg has alluded to this potential problem in discussing the Second Circuit's struggles
to harmonize copyright infringement law and the law of misappropriation. See Ginsburg,
supra note 8, at 1897 n.125 (citing Gorman, supra note 8, at 1603-04). Professor Gorman
suggested that instead of imposing a narrow view of originality/copyrightability, courts
should "adopt a -very narrow standard of infringement." Gorman, supra note 8, at 1575.
Professor Gorman also correctly noted that "[tihe more important the public interest in
procuring news reports, the more ready are the courts to define quite narrowly the standard
of infringement or to expand liberally the doctrine of fair use." Id. at 1579 (footnote omit-
ted). This theory should apply with equal force to the definition of "originality."
Because there should be a strong public interest in safeguarding a low threshold of origi-
nality, courts should also be interested in narrowly defining infringement or broadening fair
use in an effort to protect that low threshold. Courts should be, but rarely are, sensitive to
the stage of litigation at which the question of originality is adjudicated. Defendants usually
raise the issue of lack of originality as an affirmative defense, often because their cases are
weak on the substantive issue of copying. See Dworkin, supra note 7, at 70. Courts then
usually decide the issue of originality by a motion for summary judgment. Magic Mktg., Inc.
v. Mailing Servs., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769, 771 (W.D. Pa. 1986). Of the leading cases on copy-
right originality, only a handful are appeals from decisions of the Register of Copyrights.
See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Homer Laughlin China
Co. v. Oman, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1074 (D.D.C. 1991).
When the plaintiff can easily show that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work
and that the defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's, or when the plaintiff
can prove directly that the defendant copied the plaintiff's work, the defendant is backed
into a corner and forced to look desperately for defenses. Two common defenses asserted by
defendants when copying appears relatively obvious are lack of originality and fair use. The
Copyright Act articulates what was formerly the common law doctrine of fair use. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107. The doctrine sanctions certain socially desirable uses of copyrighted works on the
grounds of public policy, taking into account factors such as:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
Id. It is in these circumstances that judges most often evaluate the originality of a work.
See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); West Pub-
lishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1070 (1987); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986); L. Batlin & Son v.
Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); see discussion
infra part III. For example, when Mead Data announced that it intended to offer star pagi-
nation, which would permit LEXIS users to access West's page numbers, West sought a
preliminary injunction. West, 799 F.2d at 1221-22. The district court granted the prelimi-
nary injunction, holding that West showed a substantial likelihood that it would succeed on
the merits. Id. at 1222. Thus, this case is a typical example of a situation in which the
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second element of originality, Type II originality, and suggests that
perhaps this element ought not to be considered a dimension of
originality at all. Rather, Part V submits that this concept that
courts have viewed as an aspect of originality might be better un-
derstood as a different element of copyrightability: namely, either
as "authorship '25 or as the requirement that the copyrightable
defendant apparently has copied directly from the plaintiff and the defendant argues, as an
affirmative defense, that the plaintiff's work lacks originality. West, however, was somewhat
unusual in that the court seemed not to have flinched at the prospect of holding the defend-
ant liable, avoiding the Sirens' song of declaring a work unoriginal in order to short-circuit
the judicial process.
Courts usually decide whether a work is original as a matter of law. See, e.g., Toro, 787
F.2d at 121L Juries usually decide whether a defendant copied a plaintiff's work as a factual
issue. See, e.g., Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 1988). The jury
or other trier of fact might base its decision on either direct evidence or on whether it thinks
that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work and that the defendant's work is sub-
stantially similar to the plaintiff's. Consequently, the question of whether a work is original
lends itself rather well to disposition at the summary judgment stage. But cf. id. (noting
that "summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable minds could differ as to the
absence of substantial similarity of the copyrightable material"). Thus, defendants perceive
the issue of originality as an especially attractive Achilles' Heel at which to aim when plain-
tiffs appear likely to prove either direct copying or access and substantial similarity. If a
work is not original, it is uncopyrightable. If it is uncopyrightable, it cannot be subject to
copyright protection. If it cannot be subject to copyright protection, the defendant is free to
copy it. A number of the most tenuous originality opinions have emerged from cases in
which defendants have raised lack of originality as an affirmative defense when copying
appears indisputable. See, e.g., Toro, 787 F.2d 1208; Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300
(7th Cir. 1983); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980). Courts
should try to avoid making a questionable ruling on originality in lieu of allowing the litiga-
tion to proceed to the next phase when the defendant might prevail easily on other grounds,
such as fair use, anyway. A court ought not to sacrifice the integrity of originality jurispru-
dence in the wake of its race to what may be a just end result. The speed of such results
may, in the long run, be at the expense of a clear understanding of originality. Judges sim-
ply ought not to hold that a work is unoriginal merely because they believe that the defend-
ant did not copy his work from the plaintiff's, because they fail to appreciate the plaintiff's
work, or because they think that the defendant's use is fair. See Rockford Map Publishers,
Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1985) (asserting that judgment
should not be based on the amount of time invested in a work), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061
(1986). This is precisely the kind of mistake that judges made in the "work for hire" doc-
trine cases, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 982 (1984), in which the equities ran with the plaintiffs. The integrity of the "work
for hire" doctrine suffered temporarily-that is, until the Supreme Court overruled the Al-
don line of cases in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742-43
(1989)-because judges were leaning over backwards to make the law fit the circumstances.
25. At least two commentators have suggested that this concept should be considered
"authorship." See William Patry, Copyright in Collection of Facts: A Reply, COMM. & L.,
Oct. 1984, at 11, 18-19; Dahl, supra note 8, at 716-18.
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"something" must be characterized as a "work." This Article con-
cludes by suggesting that courts have unnecessarily distorted and
continue to distort the jurisprudence of originality by forcing this
second, more subjective component into the rubric of originality.
II. SUBSTANCE: THE THREE CLASSIFICATIONS
A. Compilations
The Copyright Act defines a compilation as "a work formed by
the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data
that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of author-
ship. '2 6 When an author creates a compilation, she begins with
specific and identifiable preexisting elements. Those elements con-
sist of three types: 1) elements capable of copyright protection in
their own right, as in the case of a collective work;2" 2) elements
that, for one reason or another, are in the public domain 2s and,
consequently, are not capable of independent copyright protection;
and 3) elements that are incapable of achieving copyright protec-
tion alone, such as raw data or facts. To create a copyrightable
work from these independent works or elements, the author must
add something of her own; that is, she must vary the preexisting
elements or works by selecting, coordinating, or arranging them.29
The Act clearly establishes that a compilation author's copyright
interest protects only "the material contributed by the author...
as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the
work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material."30
26. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
27. The Copyright Act defines a "collective work" as "a work, such as a periodical issue,
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." Id.
28. Works in the public domain are those works that are not protected by copyright. For
an extensive and insightful discussion of the concept of public domain, see Jessica Litman,
The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 101. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S. Ct.
1282, 1293 (1991), the Court emphasized the importance of the selection, coordination, or
arrangement process.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). The same concept of divisibility applies to an author's contribution
to derivative works. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34:801
1993] RETHINKING ORIGINALITY
B. Derivative Works
The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionaliza-
tion, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which the work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of ed-
itorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifica-
tions, which, as a whole, represent an original work of author-
ship, is a "derivative work".3
When an author creates a derivative work, she begins with one or
more preexisting works, which may either be subject to copyright
protection or in the public domain.3 2 The author then varies the
preexisting works by recasting, transforming, or adapting them.33
Authors commonly recast, transform, or adapt works by changing
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
32. Professor Nimmer's treatise explains that "[a] derivative work consists of a contribu-
tion of original material to a preexisting work so as to recast, transform or adapt the preex-
isting work. This would include a new version of a work in the public domain, an abridge-
ment, adaptation, arrangement, dramatization, or translation." 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, §
3.03.
The Copyright Act expressly limits copyright protection for compilations and derivative
works:
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes com-
pilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in
which such material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive
right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of,
and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of,
any copyright protection in the preexisting material.
17 U.S.C. § 103; see supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also Stewart v. Abend, 110
S. Ct. 1750, 1761 (1990) (holding that although the portions of a derivative work added by
the derivative author ar the property of that author, the full force of the copyright in the
preexisting work remains with the original author).
33. The Act's definition of a "derivative work" specifically refers to three types of activity
that can produce a derivative work-recasting, transforming, or adapting. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
This language indicates that an author must perform one or more of these three acts in
order to create a derivative work within the meaning of the Copyright Act.
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medium, size, composition, or proportions.3 4 Also, authors often
change works by adding or subtracting material.35
C. Freestanding Works
A work that is neither a compilation nor a derivative work falls
into the abyss of the undefined; the Copyright Act does not label
or define noncompilations or nonderivatives3 6 I refer to these
works as "freestanding works." Arguably, there can be no free-
standing works under the Act. Such an argument rests upon the
assumption that every work is, to some degree, either a compila-
tion of preexisting elements and/or works, or else a derivation of a
preexisting work or works.37 In one sense, this assertion must be
true. In literature, for example, the finite number of words in a
language limits an author's expression. Even if an author chooses
to create new words, the finite number of letters in the alphabet of
the language that she is using still limits the author. Consequently,
all works of literature result from the author's selection, coordina-
tion, and arrangement of words and letters.3 8 Thus, arguably, all
works of literature are mere compilations. The same is true in art.
Artists can only compile or transform preexisting elements of color,
shape, and dimension.
34. For a more in-depth discussion of the nature of the creative process, see infra part
III.C.
35. See infra part III.C.
36. See supra note 23.
37. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 332 ("Creating a new work typically
involves borrowing or building on material from a prior body of works, as well as adding
original expression to it."); Litman, supra note 28, at 966-67.
38. See Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899), in which the Court stated:
The right thus secured by the copyright act is not a right to the use of certain
words, because they are the common property of the human race, and are as
little susceptible of private appropriation as air or sunlight. . . . But the right
is to that arrangement of words which the author has selected to express his
ideas.
Id. at 86 (emphasis added); see also Raskind, supra note 8. Professor Raskind argues that:
Copyright protection subsists in the authorship of a novel, for example, by vir-
tue of the fixing of the expression-the word order. The writer has the entire
vocabulary of a formal language from which to produce that word order. By
selecting a manner of expression, without copying, there is the production of
"an original work of authorship" as the statute requires.
Id. at 132 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988)).
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Classifying all works as either compilations or derivatives, how-
ever, is not sound copyright policy. Although all works are to some
extent compilative or derivative, freestanding works do exist. As a
general rule, a freestanding work is a work that is not substantially
similar to any preexisting works or materials; if it were substan-
tially similar, then it would be either a compilation or a derivative
work.3 9 An exception to this general rule would arise when a work
does bear a substantial similarity to a preexisting work or material, .
but the substantial similarity is coincidence and not a result of
copying."
D. Class Significance
To evaluate the originality of a work in a coherent manner, a
decisionmaker first must determine whether it should be charac-
terized as a compilation, a derivative work, or a freestanding
work.41 Such a determination must be a matter of degree. If a deci-
sionmaker associates a work with some other preexisting work or
element closely enough, he must consider the later work either a
compilation or derivative work. The line that divides freestanding
works from compilations and derivatives probably looks a great
deal like the line that distinguishes substantial similarity from
nonsubstantial similarity in infringement litigation. 2 If the work
in question is substantially similar to another preexisting work or
preexisting element, then the work is probably either a compilation
39. See supra notes 23, 36-38 and accompanying text.
40. Cf. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) (stating that even if an author created a work that was identical to
a preexisting work, as long as he had created it "anew" and had not copied the preexisting
work, the new work was copyrightable).
41. See supra notes 11, 28-40 and accompanying text.
42. One of the hallmark concepts of copyright-infringement litigation is the notion of
"substantial similarity." See generally 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, §§ 7.1.1, 7.2.1, 7.2.1.2
(explaining the phrase "striking similarity"); LEAFFER, supra note 2, §§ 9.3, .5-.7 (indicating
that "access" and "substantial similarity" are circumstantial proofs of copying); 3 NIMMER,
supra note 2, § 13.03[A] (distinguishing "comprehensive nonliteral similarity" from "frag-
mented literal similarity" under substantial similarity analysis); cf. Alan Latman, "Proba-
tive Similarity" As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright In-
fringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1187, 1188-91, 1203-04 (1990) (asserting that courts often
mistakenly use a test for substantial similarity in order to prove defendant copied rather
than employing the test to show that sufficient copying has taken place to find an
infringement).
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of those preexisting materials or a derivative of them, unless the
decisionmaker concludes that the substantial similarity is coinci-
dental. If, on the other hand, the decisionmaker concludes that the
work in question is not substantially similar to a preexisting work
or works, or preexisting elements, then in most cases she likely will
categorize the work as freestanding.
In any case, unless the decisionmaker accurately classifies the
work at the outset, it will be virtually impossible to ascertain the
abstract elements necessary to analyze whether the work is Type II
original. Thus, before embarking upon any analysis of Type II
originality, a decisionmaker must first classify the work as a compi-
lation, derivative work, or freestanding work. Once again, these
three classes do not require three separate definitions of original-
ity. Rather, these classes are necessary to assist the decisionmaker
in separating conceptually an author's variations from those com-
ponents with which she began.
III. TYPE II ORIGINALITY
A. Two Dominant Articulations
Courts have defined Type II originality as requiring either some
degree of "creativity" or some "variation" of a preexisting work
that can be characterized as "more than trivial."'43 However, they
have completely avoided defining what they mean by the term
"creativity."" Similarly, not only have courts failed to explain
what they mean by a "variation," but they also have neglected to
define "trivial."45 A study of these two standards, therefore, is nec-
essary to determine whether either can yield a viable method of
judging Type II originality.
B. Feist and the "Modicum of Creativity"
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 46 is now
the leading case espousing the view that Type II originality should
43. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
44. See sources cited supra note 16.
45. See cases cited supra note 17.
46. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
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be defined in terms of "a modicum of creativity. 47 The facts of
Feist are relatively simple. Rural Telephone Service Company
(Rural) was a public utility company serving a portion of north-
west Kansas.48 A Kansas regulation required that Rural publish an
annual telephone directory.49 Rural's white pages alphabetically
listed the names of subscribers, as well as their towns and tele-
phone numbers.5 0 Feist Publications, Inc. (Feist) published area-
wide telephone directories that listed numbers in an unusually
broad geographic area, "reducing the need to call directory assis-
tance or consult multiple directories."51 When Rural refused to li-
cense its white page directory to Feist, Feist copied the informa-
tion in Rural's directory without permission.2
The United States Supreme Court, with Justice O'Connor writ-
ing for the Court, held that Feist had not infringed Rural's copy-
right because Rural's alphabetized white page directory lacked the
originality necessary to be copyrightable.5 3 In reaching this conclu-
47. Id. at 1288 (construing the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)); see supra note 16.
Not surprisingly, courts have been quick to adopt and apply Feist's requirement of "creativ-
ity." See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 703 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Court in
Feist made clear, application of the 'originality' standard to compilations of facts is nar-
rowed somewhat by the requirement of 'some minimal level of creativity.' ") (quoting Feist,
111 S. Ct. at 1294); Victor Lalli Enters. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir.
1991) ("Although novelty is not required, some 'modicum of creativity' is necessary to trans-
form simple compilation into copyrightable expression.") (quoting Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296).
In Kregos, Judge Newman remarked: "[A]s to compilations of facts, independent creation as
to selection and arrangement will not assure copyright protection; the requirement of mini-
mal creativity becomes an important ingredient of the test for copyright entitlement."
Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704; see also Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1332-33 (N.D. Ohio
1992) (holding that the author's selectivity in arranging "pertinent data" in tables made the
work a "protectible expression"); Lipton v. Nature Co., 781 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (considering the author's compilations of hunting and nature terms original because
some were "creatively interpreted from Middle English"); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Business Mach., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that software in-
struction files were "original expression").
48. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1286.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1296-97. The decision was nearly unanimous. Justice Blackmun concurred in
the judgment without writing a separate opinion. For an insightful summary of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Feist, as well as her other copyright decisions, see Marci Hamilton,
Justice O'Connor's Opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.: An
Uncommon Though Characteristic Approach, 38 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 83 (1990).
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sion, the Court carefully reviewed the concept of originality. 4 It
explained that "[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means
only that the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), 55 and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity. '56
In the midst of the opinion, the Court emphasized that original-
ity is a constitutional requirement 5 and specifically cited the
Trade-Mark Cases5  and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony59 as support for the constitutional underpinnings of origi-
nality.6 0 According to the Court, the Trade-Mark Cases and Bur-
row-Giles defined the constitutional terms "authors" and "writ-
ings" in such a way as to require originality."' Furthermore, the
Court concluded that the Trade-Mark Cases established the two
types of originality: "originality requires independent creation plus
a modicum of creativity."2 The Feist Court then emphasized
the nineteenth-century origins of "creativity" as an element of
copyrightability by quoting directly from the Trade-Mark Cases:
"'[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed ...it is
only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers
of the mind.' "3
54. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287-97.
55. See infra part IV (discussing Type I originality).
56. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287 (emphasis added) (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A]-[B] (1990)).
57. Id.
58. 100 U.S. 82 (1879); see supra note 16.
59. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
60. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288; see supra note 5.
61. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. (final emphasis added) (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94); see supra
note 5. Professor Ginsburg has explored the notion of "authorial personality," a concept
somewhat akin to creativity. Although not directly equating creativity with authorial per-
sonality, Professor Ginsburg has provided valuable background and insight regarding the
views that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes espoused in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), some 30 years after the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles:
Logically, the property-in-personality notion can be extended beyond the
privacy right, which controls disclosures about oneself contained in one's un-
published writings, to the literary property right, which controls published
manifestations of oneself as revealed in one's writings. The self-revelatory
character of literary creation justifies the creator's assertion of private property
rights in the work when published as well as in the work before it is disclosed.
Warren and Brandeis's quotation from Drone's copyright treatise favors this
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After detailed discussions of the noncopyrightability of facts, 4
the "sweat of the brow" doctrine,65 and the copyrightability of
compilations, 6 the Court deduced that "[t]here remains a narrow
category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or
so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent. 67 The opinion then
stressed that the copyright protection for a compilation is severely
limited." The Copyright Act expressly limits copyright protection
in compilations "only to the material contributed by the author."6 "
Therefore, the Court concluded that "the facts contained in ex-
isting works may be freely copied because copyright protects only
the elements that owe their origin to the compiler-the selection,
coordination, and arrangement of facts.
70
Relying upon this rule of copyrightability, the Court determined
that "[t]he selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural's
white pages do not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards
for copyright protection. 7 1 According to Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion, an alphabetical listing of names is "devoid of even the slight-
est trace of creativity. '7 2
proposition: "'The very meaning of the word "property" in its legal sense is
"that which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively
to one." The first meaning of the word from which it is derived-proprius-is
.,one's own".' " Justice Holmes may well have been echoing these ideas when
he stated that the "something irreducible which is one man's alone" and that is
present within even the most "modest grade of art" is the "something" to
which the property rights of copyright attach.
Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1884 (footnotes omitted) (quoting EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES 6 (1879), quoted in Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 206 n.1 (1890)).
64. See Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288-91.
65. See id. at 1291-93.
66. See id. at 1293-95.
67. Id. at 1294.
68. Id. at 1294-95.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988); see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
70. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1295.
71. Id. at 1296.
72. Id. The Court continued, stating.
[TJhere is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a
white pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and
so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course. It is not
only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable. This time-honored tradition does
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What the Court failed to do in Feist was explain just how it de-
termined that Rural's white pages lacked the creativity requisite to
elevate it to "original" status for purposes of copyright." Justice
O'Connor tried to explain that Rural's alphabetized white pages
failed to manifest the necessary quantum of creativity but never
alluded to any definition of "creativity." She resorted instead to
factual statements and unsubstantiated judgmental conclusions
about the nature of alphabetization. Noting initially that "the se-
lection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or rou-
tine as to require no creativity whatsoever, '"' she continued ex-
plaining her decision by characterizing Rural's white pages as
"entirely typical.1 75 In a conclusory fashion, she remarked that Ru-
ral's "end product is a garden-variety white pages directory, devoid
of even the slightest trace of creativity." 76 The opinion continued:
Rural's selection of listings could not be more obvious: it pub-
lishes the most basic information-name, town, and telephone
number-about each person who applies to it for telephone ser-
vice. This is "selection" of a sort, but it lacks the modicum of
not possess the minimal spark required by the Copyright Act and the
Constitution.
Id. at 1297 (citation omitted).
In List Publishing Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1887), a case from the same era as
the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles, the defendant had copied almost half of the
plaintiff's compilation of names. Id. at 774. Plaintiff had selected approximately 6,000 list-
ings from a pool of over 300,000 names that appeared in a general directory. Id. The defend-
ant's Social Register copied approximately 2,800 of plaintiff's listings but added about 700
of its own. Id. The court held that the plaintiff's compilation was copyrightable due to the
author's selection. Id. The defendant had also copied 39 of the plaintiff's errors, and the
evidence of these errors was sufficient for the court to find the defendant liable for infringe-
ment. Id. In Feist, Feist copied "[flour. . .fictitious listings that Rural had inserted into its
directory to detect copying." Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287. Arguably, like the 39 errors in List
Publishing, perhaps Rural's four invented listings should have been subject to copyright
protection by themselves. Thus, Rural should have been able to recover statutory damages
for infringement of the four fabricated listings. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
73. One is reminded of Justice Potter Stewart's infamous remark about hardcore pornog-
raphy. Noting that an adequate definition of hardcore pornography would be difficult to
fashion, he commented, "I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
case is not that." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Simi-
larly, Justice O'Connor did not explore what creativity is; presumably, she believes that she
knows it when she sees it.
74. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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creativity necessary to transform mere selection into copyright-
able expression. Rural expended sufficient effort to make the
white pages directory useful, but insufficient creativity to make
it original.
Nor can Rural claim originality in its coordination and ar-
rangement of facts. The white pages do nothing more than list
Rural's subscribers in alphabetical order. This arrangement
may, technically speaking, owe its origin to Rural; no one dis-
putes that Rural undertook the task of alphabetizing the names
itself. But there is nothing remotely creative about arranging
names alphabetically in a white pages directory. It is an age-old
practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it
has come to be expected as a matter of course. It is not only
unoriginal, it is practically inevitable. This time-honored tradi-
tion does not possess the minimal creative spark required by the
Copyright Act and the Constitution.77
From this explanation, one can only assume that the Court would
hold that certain works or products are noncreative. For example,
things that can be characterized as "mechanical," "entirely typi-
cal," "garden-variety," "obvious," "basic information," "mere se-
lection," "an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition," "so com-
monplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course,"
"practically inevitable," or a "time-honored tradition" apparently
lack Feist's "de minimis quantum of creativity. ' 7 In short, the Su-
preme Court did not define "creativity" in any manner other than
by default. Basically, it resorted to a form of name-calling. Items
labeled as "mechanical," "entirely typical," "garden variety," "ob-
vious," and so on, fall short of demonstrating a minimal degree of
creativity.
Not only did the Court fall to define "creativity," but it also ne-
glected to articulate a standard. The Feist opinion used five differ-
ent formulations of the "modicum of creativity" standard. It first
articulated affirmative formulations: 1) whether the plaintiff's work
"possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity";79 or 2)
77. Id. at 1296-97 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 1296.
79. Id. at 1287 (emphasis added).
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:801
whether the plaintiff's work displayed "a modicum of creativity.""0
It then added negative formulations: 3) whether the plaintiffs
work was one in which "the creative spark is utterly lacking";81 4)
whether "the creative spark" existing in the plaintiffs work was
"so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent"; 2 and 5) whether the
plaintiff's work was "devoid of even the slightest trace of creativ-
ity."8 3 Words like "degree," "modicum," "spark," and "trace" are
inherently ambiguous and imprecise. The Court's inability to iden-
tify a viable standard for determining creativity is understandable.
Linguistically speaking, unless a decisionmaker is willing to require
simply that a work "be creative," she is forced to qualify the broad
concept of creativity by some limiting measurement. The Court's
attempts at qualification-use of words such as "degree," "modi-
cum," "spark," and "trace"-illustrate the difficulty of defining
copyright originality in terms of "creativity."
C. Toward a Legal Definition of "Creativity"
The only logical approach to embracing Feist's creativity re-
quirement is to fashion a legal definition for the word "creativity."
"Creativity," like "originality," itself is subject to widely disparate
interpretations.8 4 At least two cases have made inadequate at-
80. Id. at 1288 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1294 (emphasis added).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 1296 (emphasis added).
84. In the copyright context, the Code of Federal Regulations provides that "[i]n order to
be acceptable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the work must embody some crea-
tive authorship in its delineation or form." 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1991). These regulations
do not, however, define "creative authorship."
It is perhaps not surprising that federal statutory law is quite thin when it comes to defi-
nitions of "creativity" in branches of law other than copyright. For example, federal labor
regulations discuss "creativity" as a limiting factor in determining whether an artist can be
considered an employee employed in a professional capacity, stating in pertinent part:
(1) The work must be original and creative in character, as opposed to work
which can be produced by a person endowed with general manual or intellec-
tual ability and training. In the field of music there should be little difficulty in
ascertaining the application of the requirement. Musicians, composers, conduc-
tors, soloists, all are engaged in original and creative work within the sense of
this definition. In the plastic and graphic arts the requirement is, generally
speaking, met by painters who at most are given the subject matter of their
painting. It is similarly met by cartoonists who are merely told the title or
underlying concept of a cartoon and then must rely on their own creative pow-
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tempts to define "creativity" in terms of copyright law: Gardenia
Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc.85 and Bailie v. Fisher.6
Neither case offers a clear discussion or satisfactory definition. In
Gardenia Flowers, the court contented itself by quoting the 1964
version of Professor Nimmer's treatise for the enigmatic proposi-
tion: " 'Where creativity refers to the nature of the work itself,
originality refers to the nature of the author's contribution to the
work.' -7 In Bailie, the court stated that the work in question
failed to qualify as "a work of art."88 Professor Nimmer's treatise
still contains the rather cryptic explanation:
The requirement of originality must be distinguished from the
requirement of creativity .... Where creativity refers to the
nature of the work itself, originality refers to the nature of the
author's contribution to the work. Thus a public domain paint-
ing may evince great creativity, but if a copyright claimant adds
nothing of his own to it, by way of reproduction or otherwise,
then copyright will be denied on the basis of lack oforiginality
[sic]. Conversely, a work may be entirely the product of the
ers to express the concept. It would not normally be met by a peron [sic] who
is employed as a copyist, or as an "animator" of motion-picture cartoons, or as
a retoucher of photographs since it is not believed that such work is properly
described as creative in character.
(2) In the field of writing the distinction is perhaps more difficult to draw.
Obviously the requirement is met by essayists or novelists or scenario writers
who choose their own subjects and hand in a finished piece of work to their
employers (the majority of such persons are, of course, not employees but self-
employed). The requirement would also be met, generally speaking, by persons
holding the more responsible positions in advertising agencies.
29 C.F.R. § 541.303(c) (1991).
The regulations opine that "[o]nly writing which is analytical, interpretative or highly
individualized is considered to be original and creative in nature," id. § 541.303(f)(1), and
that "[tihe reporting of news, the rewriting of stories received from various sources, or the
routine editorial work of a newspaper is not predominately original and creative in charac-
ter." Id. § 541.303(f)(2). Of course, such writing would be copyrightable under traditional
U.S. copyright principles.
85. 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
86. 258 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
87. Gardenia Flowers, 280 F. Supp. at 781 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER, ON COPYRIGHT
§ 19.2 (1964)).
88. Bailie, 258 F.2d at 426. For discussions of the multitudinous'problems that arise when
courts try to define "art," see Leonard Duboff, What is Art? Toward a Legal Definition, 12
HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 303 (1990); Russ VerSteeg, Iguanas, Toads and Toothbrushes:
Land Use Regulation of Art as Signage, 25 GA. L. REv. 437, 463-65 (1991).
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claimant's independent efforts, and hence original, but may nev-
ertheless be denied protection as a work of art if it is completely
lacking in any modicum of creativity. 9
The word "creativity" comes from the Latin verb creo-'"to beget,
sire; . . to give birth to."90 Professor Nimmer's treatise discusses
Congress' reticence to use the term in the Copyright Act:
Note the following explanation of language identical to that of
present Sec. 102(a), as contained in the 1965 Revision Bill (H.R.
4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 102): " . . . when it came to
drafting, a great deal of concern was expressed about the dan-
gers of using a word like 'creative' . . . it was argued that the
word might lead courts to establish a higher standard of
copyrightability than now existing under the decisions. . .Our
intention here is to maintain the established standards of origi-
nality without implying any further requirements of aesthetic
value, novelty, or ingenuity." 91
Thus, Feist's creativity requirement appears to have collided with
Congress' express intent assiduously to avoid using creativity as an
element of copyrightability 92
For centuries, scholars in disciplines such as philosophy, cogni-
tive science, psychology, and psychiatry have tried to define and
explain "creativity." 93 Although the concept has proved intractable
in many respects, a great deal of important work has been done
89. 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.08[B][2] (footnotes omitted). Not only is Professor Nim-
mer's "definition" of creativity enigmatic, it appears to contradict the Court's holding in
Feist.
90. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 456 (P.G.W. Glare ed., 1982).
91. 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.01[B], at 2-15 n.31 (alterations in original).
92. One commentator has expressly endorsed using "creativity" as a requirement for
copyrightability. Judith M. Nelson, Note, Art Forgery and Copyright Law: Modifying the
Originality Requirement to Prevent the Forging of Artworks, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
683, 687 n.35, 702-09 (1990). This commentator, however, provides no clue as to how she
would define "creativity."
93. Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Descartes, Hobbs, Locke, Berke-
ley, Hume, and Kant, for example, speculated on the nature of the mind and its creative
powers. See generally SAMUEL E. STUMPF, SOCRATES TO SARTRE: A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
(3d ed. 1982) (considering in turn the perspectives of these philosophers on the creative
mind). One notable work from the 19th century is FRANCIS GALTON, HEREDITARY GENIUS (2d
ed. 1892) (attributing creative ability, among other cognitive functions, to heredity). Twenti-
eth-century philosophers have continued this inquiry. See, e.g., HENRI BERGSON, THE CREA-
TIVE MIND (Mabelle L. Andison trans., 1946) (positing that intuition as opposed to intelli-
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during the twentieth century. 4 One especially profound work in
the field of creativity research is Dr. Silvano Arieti's book, Creativ-
ity: The Magic Synthesis,95 in which he provided an historical in-
gence is the essential element of creative thinking); JACQUES MARITAIN, CREATIVE INTUITION
IN ART AND POETRY (1953).
94. To say that creativity literature is voluminous would be a gross understatement. See,
e.g., SILVANO ARIETI, CREATIVITY: THE MAGIC SYNTHESIS (1976); FRANK BARRON, CREATIVE
PERSON AND CREATIVE PROCESS (1969); CAROL ANN BEEMAN, JUST THIS SIDE OF MADNESS:
CREATIVITY AND THE DRIVE TO CREATE (1990); THE CONCEPT OF CREATIVITY IN SCIENCE AND
ART (Denis Dutton & Michael Krausz eds., 1981); CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO CREATIVE
THINKING (Howard E. Gruber et al. eds., 1967); CREATIVITY: PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL
(Calvin W. Taylor ed., 1964); DANIEL DERVIN, CREATIVITY AND CULTURE: A PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS IN THE ARTS, SCIENCES AND CULTURE (1990); HOWARD
GARDNER, ART, MIND, AND BRAIN: A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO CREATIVITY (1984); JOHN E.
GEDO & MARY M. GEDO, PERSPECTIVES ON CREATIVITY RESEARCH: THE BIOGRAPHICAL METHOD
(1992); JACOB W. GETZELS & PHILIP W. JACKSON, CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE (1962);
BREWSTER GHISELIN, THE CREATIVE PROCESS (1952); WILLIAM J.J. GORDON, SYNECTICS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CREATIVE CAPACITY (1961); ROBERT GRUDIN, THE GRACE OF GREAT THINGS:
ON THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY (1991); EMANUEL F. HAMMER, CREATIVITY. TALENT AND PER-
SONALITY (1985); DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE ES-
SENCE OF MIND AND PATTERN (1985); ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION (1964); DAVID
LAMB, DISCOVERY, CREATIVITY AND PROBLEM-SOLVING (1991); THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY
(Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1988); ROBERT A. PRENTKY, CREATIVITY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
(1980); BURTON RAFFEL, ARTISTS ALL: CREATIVITY, THE UNIVERSITY, AND THE WORLD (1991);
THEORIES OF CREATIVITY (Mark A. Runco & Robert S. Albert eds., 1990); ROBERT W.
WEISBERG, CREATIVITY: GENIUS AND OTHER MYTHS (1986); Paul Feyerabend, Creativity-A
Dangerous Myth, 13 CRITICAL INQUIRY 700 (1987); Ignacio L. G6tz, On Defining Creativity,
39 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 297 (1981); Kurt Motamedi, Extending the Concept of
Creativity, 16 J. CREATIVE BEHAVIOR 75 (1982); Lloyd D. Noppe, The Relationship of For-
mal Thought and Cognitive Styles to Creativity, 19 J. CREATIVE BEHAVIOR 88 (1985); Ruth
Richards et al., Assessing Everyday Creativity: Characteristics of the Lifetime Creativity
Scales and Validation with Three Large Samples, 54 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 476
(1988); Ruth Richards, Everyday Creativity, Eminent Creativity, and Health, 3 CREATIVITY
RES. J. 300 (1990); Maria Sfgi & Ivan VitAnyi, Toward a General Theory of Human Creativ-
ity, 22 ZYGON 57 (1987); Colin Symes, Creativity: A Divergent Point of View, J. AESTHETIC
EDUC., Summer 1983, at 83; John G. Young, What is Creativity?, 19 J. CREATIVE BEHAVIOR
77 (1985). For a more complete bibliography, see ARIETI, supra, at 415-29.
Even though much work has been done, no clear consensus has emerged regarding the
meaning of "creativity" in scientific circles. One psychologist has observed: "The fact is that
there is little agreement as to what being 'creative' and having 'creativity' mean or much
less how they are to be operationalized. Evidence 6f these difficulties is in the number and
variety of definitions and tests for creativity and their weak real-world predictive validities."
Robert S. Albert, Identity, Experiences, and Career Choice Among the Exceptionally
Gifted and Eminent, in THEORIES OF CREATIVITY, supra, at 13, 15 (citations omitted).
95. ARIETI, supra note 94. The late Dr. Arieti was a renowned psychoanalyst and profes-
sor of clinical psychiatry at New York Medical College. Josh Barbanel, Silvano Arieti, Psy-
choanalyst and Writer on Schizophrenia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1981, at Dl. His writings
concentrated primarily on two topics: schizophrenia and creativity. He was the editor-in-
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troduction to the most important psychological and psychoanalytic
theories of creativity.9 6 Arieti discussed the psychological theories
of Joseph Wallas, who in 1926 hypothesized that creativity con-
sisted of four distinct stages: preparation, incubation, illumination,
and verification.97
These words are in common use and clearly represent what the
author meant. Preparation is the phase during which the crea-
tive person does all the preliminary work. He thinks in a sort of
free way, he collects, he searches, listens to suggestions, lets his
mind wander. The stage of incubation is inferred from the fact
that a certain period of time, ranging from a few minutes to
months or years, elapses between the period of preparation and
that of illumination. We must thus assume that after the stage
of external preparation, the collected material is not just stored
in the creative person's mind, lying there in a state of passivity.
Presumably, in ways unknown to us or of which we have little
or no consciousness, the accumulated material undergoes an in-
ternal elaboration and organization. The illumination occurs
when the creative person sees the solution to his problem. It is
at times a sudden intuition, or a clear insight, or a feeling-
something between a "hunch" and a "solution" and at other
times the result of a sustained effort. In any case it has to pass
the stage of verification in order to be definitely accepted by the
critical evaluation of the innovator.98
Others have followed Wallas' "stages" model, but they have
sometimes modified or added to the stages. For example, in 1931,
Joseph Rossman proposed that creativity involves seven stages: 1)
chief of the prestigious American Handbook of Psychiatry, an industry-standard, seven-
volume treatise. He won a National Book Award for Interpretations of Schizophrenia in
1975, wrote Creativity: The Magic Synthesis in the following year, and authored six other
books on various topics during his lifetime. Id.
A native of Pisa, Italy, Arieti received his M.D. from the University of Pisa in 1938. Upon
immigrating to the United States just prior to World War II, he received a fellowship to
study at the New York State Psychiatric Institute and Hospital. In addition, he did a resi-
dency at Pilgrim State Hospital in 1941. He acquired his psychoanalytic training at the
William Alanson White Institute from 1946 to 1952. In 1953, he began his academic career
as an associate professor at the State University of New York College of Medicine. He re-
ceived an appointment as a full professor at New York Medical College in 1961. Id.
96. See ARIETI, supra note 94, at 14-34.
97. Id. at 15.
98. Id.
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an observation of a need or difficulty; 2) an analysis of the need; 3)
a survey of all available information; 4) a formulation of all objec-
tive solutions; 5) a critical analysis of these solutions for their ad-
vantages and disadvantages; 6) the birth of the new idea-the in-
vention; and 7) experimentation "to test out the most promising
solution, and the selection and perfection of the final embodiment
by some or all of the previous steps."9 Arieti reviewed several ad-
.ditional "stages" interpretations of creativity advanced by other
investigators, but he concluded that although they "all seem ac-
ceptable and good beginnings in a pioneering effort to understand
this intricate subject," they really failed to take our understanding
of creativity much further than common sense, since common
sense tells us that many processes can be perceived as unfolding in
phases.100
Arieti believed that psychoanalytic theories were more useful
tools for understanding the creative process than the psychological
"stages" theories and noted that most modern psychoanalytical
theoreticians have developed their notions about creativity within
a Freudian framework.10 1 Freud "intended to contribute to the
study of creativity by reaffirming the importance of unconscious
process, especially of unconscious motivation. ' 10 2 Although Arieti
disagreed with many of Freud's conclusions about creativity, he
nevertheless saw Freud as being "responsible for a breakthrough
that led to a better understanding of the formal psychological
mechanisms of the creative process.''103
Arieti then provided an overview of the work of Ernst Kris, who
"stressed the importance of the primary process in the formal
mechanisms of creativity" and "considered the use of the primary
process in creativity as 'a regression in the service of the ego.' "104
Prior to Kris, Freud had developed the notion of the "primary pro-
cess" as "a way in which the psyche functions, especially the un-
conscious part of the psyche. It prevails in dreams and some
99. Id. at 15-16.
100. Id. at 17-18.
101. Id. at 24-28.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
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mental illnesses, especially psychoses."' 10 5 Arieti also discussed con-
tributions by other Freudian psychologists such as Lawrence
Kubie, who furthered Kris' theory "that creativity is a product of
the preconscious and not the unconscious"; 10 6 Phyllis Greenacre,
who theorized that "the ego of the future artist is capable of disso-
ciating itself from real objects and thus developing a 'love affair
with the world' ,,;10o and Philip Weissman, who thought that "the
child who will become a creative person has the ability to diverge
the energy originally invested in primitive personal objects and to
invest it again in creative work."' 1 8
Arieti also summarized Jung's contributions to creativity theory:
Jung believed that the creative process ... occurs in two
modes: the psychological and the visionary. In the psychological
mode the content of the creative product is drawn from the
realm of human consciousness. Although the vast realm of
human experience-in its relation to such things as love, family,
environment, society, crime, human destiny in general-usually
appears in the content of the work of art, this mode of creativity
"nowhere transcends the bounds of psychological intelligibility."
Everything in it "belongs to the realm of the understandable."
The psychological mode submits the material to a direct, con-
scious, and purposeful aim.
The visionary is the mode that concerns Jung more deeply. In
this second mode, the content does not originate in the lessons
of life but from timeless depth, from what Jung calls "the collec-
tive unconscious." The collective unconscious is the depository
of the archetypes-primordial experiences that have repeatedly
occurred in the course of generations. 10 9
Arieti then gave a nutshell version of Jung's conception of the cre-
ative process as "an unconscious animation of the archetype.' 1"H
Arieti also explained his own insights and theories about what it
is that occurs in our brains that we call "creativity.""' Briefly
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id. at 25.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 26.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 27.
111. Id. at 37-98.
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stated, he saw creativity as a combination of mental processes at
differing levels. He began by discussing "imagery" and the most
basic cognitive perceptions."1 2 He then explained the relationship
between the imagery process and what he called "the endocon-
cept," or "amorphous cognition. 11 3 Arieti described the endocon-
cept as "a kind of cognition that occurs without representa-
tion-that is, without being expressed in images, words, thoughts,
or actions of any kind . . . .The endoconcept has also been re-
ferred to by other authors as nonverbal, unconscious, or precon-
scious cognition.111
4
He then introduced the concept of "paleologic" or "primary pro-
cess" thinking.1 5 According to Arieti, "At the paleologic level the
individual starts to think categorically, or in terms of classes; but
these categories are not reliable. Being primary, they are at the
mercy of emotions or random associations and do not respect the
Aristotelian law of identity: that A is always A, never B."'1 6 Arieti
contended that paleologic thinking
occurs as a transient stage in the large majority of creative
processes. At first the creative person tends to identify disparate
subjects, not just in the fields of literature and art, but also in
science. This tendency is arrested whenever he succeeds in con-
trolling himself, and only similes or metaphors result."
7
Before one can comprehend creativity, one must first grasp the dis-
tinction between paleologic, or primary-process, and "secondary
process" thinking.
[P]Timary-process thinking organizes classes or categories that
differ from those of secondary-process thinking, or of Aristote-
lian logic. In secondary-process thinking and in standard Aristo-
telian logic, a class is a collection of objects to which a concept
applies. For instance, Washington, Lincoln, Roosevelt, Jefferson,
and so on form a class to which the concept "President of the
United States" applies. But in paleologic or primary-process
112. Id. at 37-52.
113. Id. at 53-65.
114. Id. at 54 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 66-67.
116. Id. at 74.
117. Id.
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thinking, a class is a collection of objects that have a predicate
or a part in common . . . and that become identical or
equivalent by virtue of this common part or predicate. The for-
mulation of a primary-process class is often an unconscious
mechanism. Whereas the members of a secondary process class
are recognized as being similar (and it is in fact on their similar-
ity that their classification is based), the members of a primary-
process class are freely interchanged .... "I
Creativity, then, is an assembly process. The primary process
and secondary process generate an infinity of combinations that
persons either accept or reject. According to Arieti, creativity oc-
curs when a person accepts any given combination, whether initi-
ated by paleologic or Aristotelian logic, or a fusion of the two. He
described the process as follows:
At times either the primary or secondary processes present
the possibility to consciousness that there is a union or associa-
tion between fact A and fact C, while at the same time no expla-
nation can be found for such an association. Therefore a search
starts for B, the link that would explain the union of A and C.
The primary process may offer a series of hypothetical B's, but
only one of them is the real, or desired, B; and it must ulti-
mately be chosen by the secondary process....
Just as the secondary process of every human being must re-
sort to a so-called reality test, the secondary process of the crea-
tive person must resort to a so-called creatability test, when
a decision must be made whether or not to accept the newly-
conceived material. If the material passes this test, it will be
used for the completion of the creative product.'19
The idea that creativity is an assembly process comports well
with the Copyright Act's definition of a compilation, which re-
quires selection, coordination, or arrangement. 12  This idea also
corresponds with Judge Frank's statement in Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.121 that even if an author "hit[s] upon...
118. Id. at 71.
119. Id. at 86.
120. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
121. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
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a variation unintentionally, [he] may adopt it as his and copyrightit.,,22
In the first pages of his book, Arieti summarized one of his cen-
tral theses: there exists a "special combination of primary and sec-
ondary process mechanisms" which he called the "tertiary pro-
cess." 123 He noted, however, that "in a certain number of creative
processes the matching is not necessarily between primary and sec-
ondary process mechanisms, but between faulty or archaic and
normal mechanisms, all of which belong to the secondary pro-
cess."124 He also characterized these processes as "tertiary."1 5
For Arieti, then, the creative process was comprised of the cogni-
tive mechanisms that permit human beings to appreciate the po-
tentiality for linking concepts. In terms of copyright law, it is, per-
haps, easiest to understand Arieti's explanation of creativity as it
relates to a derivative work: assuming that the archetype from
which the author derives her work is Arieti's "A," and the material
that the author adds to A is "C," the author's creative enterprise
would be the process of linking A and C by discovering the nexus,
or Arieti's "B."
Another path is also worthy of consideration. In addition to psy-
chological and psychoanalytic theories of creativity, one may con-
sider whether creativity has a biological basis. Arieti devoted an
entire chapter of his book to this inquiry.126 At the outset he ac-
knowledged that "[a]ny attempt toward a neurological or
neurophysiological interpretation of creativity can be made only in
the most pioneering and tentative way. 1 1 27 Arieti explained that
most creativity is generated in specific regions of the cerebral cor-
tex.1 28 Beyond this, however, he openly admitted that "we do not
know, at a neurophysiological level, how the networks of these two
areas function. . . .[W]e know much more about the psychologi-
122. Id. at 105 (emphasis added). For a more extensive discussion of the Alfred Bell case
and its relationship to creativity and originality, see infra part III.D.1.
123. ARIrx, supra note 94, at 12.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 387-404.
127. Id. at 387.
128. Arieti called them TOP and PF because they contain portions of the temporal, oc-
cipital, and parietal prefrontal lobes, respectively. Id. at 392-94.
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cal processes than about the concomitant neurophysiological mech-
anisms. ' 12'Thus, at present, the scientific community recognizes
that it is unable to explain creativity in biological terms. Arieti hy-
pothesized that "when it comes to creativity, unusual networks of
neurons are formed"; 130 nevertheless, we simply do not yet know
the precise nature of the activity in which neurons engage during
the creative process.
Even if we were able to devise an acceptable legal definition
of "creativity" using modern psychological, psychoanalytic, or
neurophysiological theories, it is arguable that such a definition
would still be inappropriate. A contemporary definition of "crea-
tivity" could be considered anachronistic. In Feist, the Supreme
Court specifically cited Justice Samuel Miller's opinion in the
Trade-Mark Cases'3' as the precedent that compels us to use crea-
tivity as an element of originality. 132 It is appropriate, therefore, to
explore exactly what Justice Miller intended when he wrote, in
1879, that "the word writings. . . include[s] . . . only such as are
original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind.'1 33
Justice Miller was born in Richmond, Kentucky in 1816, the first
of eight children.' He was raised on a farm and "had his school-
ing at the academy in Richmond."'135 At the age of eighteen he be-
gan studying medicine at Transylvania University in Lexington,
Kentucky and graduated in 1838. 13 He found special delight in de-
bating politics and ultimately determined to change professions,
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
132. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1288 (1991);
supra notes 5, 58-63 and accompanying text. Justice Miller used another lofty-sounding but
unclear phrase to refer to "originality": "the fruits of intellectual labor." Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. at 94, quoted in Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288. He also contrasted trademarks
with copyrights, essentially defining copyrightable subject matter by way of negative com-
parison, stating that protection for trademarks, unlike copyrights, does not "depend upon
novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination,
no genius, no laborious thought." Id.
133. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. This approach admittedly does not consider the
views of the other eight Justices who served on the Court with Justice Miller.
134. CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890, at 4
(1939).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 5.
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entering law in the mid-1840s.3 7 His chief biographer summarized
Justice Miller's decisionmaking skills as follows:
Justice Miller's strength lay in the wisdom of his judgments
rather than in the artistry of their doctrinal elaboration. He
wrought with an eye to practical results rather than to formal
elegance. His preparation for the bar had afforded no adequate
study of the law against its historical and philosophical back-
ground. Neither his tastes nor the exigencies of a busy life were
conducive to theoretical reflections. To a student of analytical
jurisprudence his opinions would be far less instructive than, for
example, those of his brother Bradley. It is therefore not sur-
prising occasionally to find a sound decision placed upon an im-
permanent foundation.13
It is likely, then, that Justice Miller did not carefully select the
phrase "the creative powers of the mind" with a specific back-
ground or meaning in mind. Perhaps he merely liked the sound of
the phrase. Unlike many learned men of his day, he had not been
trained in the Classics. In fact, he once commented that, in his
opinion, the importance of studying Greek and Latin in prepara-
tion for a career in law had been greatly exaggerated.1' Conse-
quently his expression, "the creative powers of the mind," proba-
bly was not intended to reflect Platonic, Aristotelian, or Ciceronian
ideals of creativity. 140 He did, however, read novels regularly' 4 ' and
137. Id. at 7-15.
138. Id. at 248.
139. Id. at 25.
140. Indeed, in Plato's view, creativity might have been virtually impossible to achieve.
Plato theorized that people were incapable of creating new concepts and ideas since people
merely recognize or appreciate that which they already know. See generally PLATO'S REPUB-
LW, BOOK X 439-84 (Leonardo Taram ed., 1987) (arguing that poets and painters are mere
imitators of reality). There is some evidence that by the time of the Renaissance, the term
"-creativity' was thought of primarily in terms of an imitation of the established 'masters'
and of nature," as opposed to "genius" which implied "superior creative ability." GEORGE
BECKER, THE MAD GENIUS CONTROVERSY 23 (1978).
It was not until about the mid-sixteenth century that this ideal was challenged
by Leonardo, Vasari and Telesio, who insisted that the "genio" should not be
just imitatively creative, but newly creative. However, this attack on the "im-
itatio-ideal" did not become commonly accepted during the late Renaissance
and, generally, had to be justified under the cloak of eclecticism and, particu-
larly in the arts, by the dictum of faithfulness to nature.
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recommended the works of Milton, Pope, Addison, and Steele.142
Perhaps he intended his phrase, "the creative powers of the mind,"
to mean the sort of literary imagination represented by such au-
thors. This theory, however, is only speculation, and even if a high
order of literary imagination is what he intended, subsequent
Courts clearly have rejected such a lofty mandate. 143
Perhaps the most potentially illuminating interpretation of Jus-
tice Miller's view of originality and creativity is found in his opin-
ion in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, T which he wrote
five years after the Trade-Mark Cases. We must, however, recog-
nize a significant caveat when examining Burrow-Giles for this
purpose. In that case, Justice Miller used neither the phrase "the
creative powers of the mind" nor the word "creativity" to describe
copyrightable subject matter. Furthermore, although he employed
numerous terms to characterize the mental processes that precede
copyrightable expression, he did not define those terms, nor did he
use them consistently or with any measure of precision. The prin-
cipal terms that he used to describe these intangibles were: "genius
or intellect,"1 45 "original intellectual conceptions,' '1 48 "intellectual
conception of [the] author, in which there is novelty, invention,
originality, ' '1 47 "originality of thought, ' '141 "novelty, ' '1 49 "original-
ity,' ' 50 "intellectual production,' 5' "conception,"' 15  "intellectual
... It is around the start of the eighteenth century that the term genius
began to acquire its modern meaning, in the sense that it was used to denote a
mysterious quality-a creative energy-that certain individuals were assessed
as possessing.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
141. FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 428.
142. Id. at 26.
143. See, for example, Justice Holmes' opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); see also supra note 20 (quoting Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251).
144. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). This opinion was also cited in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1288 (1991).
145. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 59.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 60.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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invention,"153 "authorship," 154 and "intellectual creation.' 1 55 He
scattered these phrases about the opinion somewhat indiscrimi-
nately, offering little explanation as to their intended meanings.
In Burrow-Giles, the principal issue was whether Sarony's pho-
tograph of Oscar Wilde was a "writing" and thus within the ambit
of the constitutional requirement that copyrightable subject mat-
ter be a "writing[ ]" of an "author."'5 6 With Justice Miller writing
the opinion, the Court held that the photograph was both original
and copyrightable. 1' 7 Justice Miller first described copyrightable
subject matter as, essentially, the result of a process of translation
from an author's idea to its visible expression. "By writings in that
clause is meant the literary productions of those authors, and Con-
gress very properly has declared these to include all forms of writ-
ing, printing, engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression.' 5 s Two
paragraphs later, he asserted that "the Constitution is broad
enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far
as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of
the author.''59 It may be significant that this translation process
seems somewhat like the assembly process that - Dr. Arieti de-
scribed when discussing "creativity.' 6 0 Justice Miller acknowl-
edged that some photographs could be considered "mere mechani-
cal reproduction[s] of the physical features or outlines of some
object animate or inanimate, and involv[ing] no originality of
thought or any novelty in the intellectual operation connected with
[their] visible reproduction in shape of a picture."'' He suggested
that "[t]his may be true in regard to the ordinary production of a
photograph, and, further, that in such case a copyright is no pro-
tection.' 162 Nevertheless, Justice Miller stressed that the trial
153. Id.
154. Id. at 61.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 64-66; see supra note 5.
157. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60-61.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 111-19.
161. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59.
162. Id. He recognized, however, that "[o]n the question as thus stated we decide noth-
ing." Id.
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court had concluded, as a matter of fact, that the photograph at
issue was a
useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture,
and that plaintiff made the same. . entirely from his own orig-
inal mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing
the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and ar-
ranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in
said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful
outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting
and evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition,
arrangement, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he
produced the picture in suit.163
Justice Miller thus concluded that "[t]hese findings . . . show
this photograph to be an original work of art, the product of plain-
tiff's intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the author
... ,164 Justice Miller only hinted at his definition of originality
and intellectual invention when he said that, in infringement liti-
gation, "the supposed author"' 5 must prove "the existence of...
originality, of intellectual production of thought, and conception
on the part of the author." 166 Unfortunately, he did not separate
and explain these three concepts.
Nevertheless, his willingness to find originality and authorship in
Sarony's photograph indicates that his notion of these mental pre-
requisites for copyrightability was, in fact, an open-minded one.
Justice Miller found "originality," "intellectual production of
thought," and "conception" in Sarony's "posing" the subject, "se-
lecting and arranging" the attire and surroundings of the subject,
"arranging the subject," and "arranging and disposing the light
and shade" on the subject.167 Thus, Justice Miller's opinion in Bur-
row-Giles recommends a concept of creativity that depends pri-
marily on an author's ability to select and arrange component
parts to result in something that is " 'useful, new, harmonious,
characteristic, and graceful.' "168 To be sure, these posing, select-
163. Id. at 60.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 59.
166. Id. at 60.
167. See id.
168. Id. (quoting the findings of fact).
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ing, and arranging activities represent a significantly lower thresh-
old of copyrightability than one requiring literary ability on the
level of a Pope, Addison, or Steele."6 9
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,170
the Supreme Court held that in order to be original-and therefore
copyrightable-a work must be the product of a particular process
entailing a minimal degree of creativity.1 7 1 Therefore, arguably,
Feist requires that courts investigate the functioning of an author's
brain. how, then, ought we proceed? As was noted, the psychologi-
cal "stages" explanations of creativity leave a great deal to be de-
sired.1 2 An adequate neurological explanation is simply unavaila-
ble, given our present limited understanding of the physiology of
the cerebral cortex.173 We can only speculate about the "original
intent" of Justice Miller's phrase, "the creative powers of the
mind," in the Trade-Mark Cases. Furthermore, his use of terms
like "original," "intellectual invention," "intellectual production
• . . of thought," and "conception" in Burrow-Giles provide noth-
ing more than a meager hint of what his concept of creativity
might have been-although his discussion in Burrow-Giles indi-
cates that an author's translation from idea to visible expression,
as well as her selection and arrangement, can contribute to
copyrightability (and perhaps to originality, creativity, or au-
thorship).
Finally, even using the best definition of creativity available
from the scientific community-a modern psychoanalytic explana-
tion of creativity, like Arieti's-as a standard for originality, we
169. See supra text accompanying note 142. It is worthwhile to note that Justice Miller
relied, in part, on a British case, Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B. 627 (Eng. C.A. 1883), in which
the question of authorship of a photograph of the Australian cricket team was at issue.
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61 (citing Nottage, 11 Q.B. at 627). Justice Miller quoted one
judge who described" 'the author' [as] 'the person who has superintended the arrangement,
who has actually formed the picture by putting the persons in position, and arranging the
place where the people are to be-the man who is the effective cause of that.' "Id. (quoting
Nottage, 11 Q.B. at 632 (Brett, M.R.)). After quoting this language and brief excerpts from
the other British jurists, Justice Miller concluded: "These views of the nature of authorship
and of originality, intellectual creation, and the right to protection confirm what we have
already said." Id.
170. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
171. Id. at 1287.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 126.30.
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still face a virtually insurmountable task." 4 To determine whether
a work is the product of creativity, it is necessary to discover
whether the work's author engaged in the creative process, at least
to some minimal degree. Determining whether an author engaged
in some minimal degree of creativity using Arieti's psychoanalytic
model of creativity requires a discovery of what cognitive steps the
author took in producing the work. Specifically, one must deter-
mine whether the author's primary or secondary processes gener-
ated associations that her conscious mind then synthesized to pro-
duce the work. 175
Courts always have been hard pressed to determine what it is
that has gone on in a person's brain. This difficulty, for example,
has led to extensive problems with the meanings of terms like "in-
tent," "knowledge," "scienter," and "mens rea" in the areas of
criminal law, torts, and contracts." 6 Defining whether a murder
defendant is insane is troublesome for precisely the same reason.
In contract law, in assessing whether a contract had been formed,
courts used to wonder whether the parties had "a meeting of the
minds."' 77 In these areas of the law, courts have adopted basically
two approaches to dealing with their acknowledged inability to
climb into a person's skull in order to evaluate the internal work-
ings of the human brain. One approach has been to use medical
experts. Murder trials, for instance, often become a parade of psy-
chiatric experts testifying about a defendant's sanity (or lack
174. In addition to Dr. Arieti's comprehensive explanation of creativity, there are scores
of other modern scientific models and definitions of creativity that have been proposed,
some of which even use "originality" as an element of "creativity." See, e.g., Richards et al.,
supra note 94, at 476. Professor Richards states:
Creativity is identified by two widely employed criteria (after Barron, 1969):
(a) originality-new or unusual elements must be involved, and (b) adaption to
reality-outcomes must be meaningful to others rather than random or idio-
syncratic. Creativity so defined may be identified in virtually any field of activ-
ity. Assessment need not be restricted-as it often is-to traditionally creative
areas of endeavor (e.g., the arts and sciences) and to accomplishments that are
socially recognized.
Id.; see also supra note 94 (listing selected literature on creativity).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 111-25.
176. See, e.g., Ann Hopkins, Comment, Mens Rea and the Right to Trial by Jury, 76 CAL.
L. REv. 391 (1988) (discussing the historical development of "mens rea" and "intent" in
American criminal law).
177. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939,
943-44 (1967).
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thereof). Another approach has been to adopt an objective stan-
dard in lieu of an impractical or unworkable subjective one. For
example, the so-called "objective theory of contract" has almost
universally replaced the "meeting of the minds" standard. 178
So, then, it must be with the determination of creativity in copy-
right law. Courts must decide whether they wish to allow the exis-
tence vel non of creativity to be determined by the testimony of
medical experts. Medical experts would, presumably, interview the
author, asking questions about the process that she used when pro-
ducing a work, in order to determine whether the appropriate syn-
thesis existed between primary and secondary processes. In the al-
ternative, courts could undertake to design an objective test that
can provide practical results. Evaluating an author's contribution
from an objective standpoint instead of investigating her psyche
may prove to be a more viable method of determining whether
Feist's creativity requirement has been satisfied. Interestingly
enough, some psychologists prefer to define "creativity" in terms
of social context.179 One .such psychologist, Dr. Mihaly Csik-
szentmihalyi, explains that "[i]t is impossible to tell whether or not
an object. . . is creative by simply looking at it. Without a histori-
cal context, one lacks the reference points necessary to determine
if the product is in fact an adaptive innovation. '" 180 He gives the
following example:
[C]onsider the case of a forger who can exactly reproduce some
painting that we have agreed to recognize as creative-one origi-
nally painted by, let us say, Rembrandt. The two canvases, the
original and the forgery, are completely indistinguishable. Does
it follow from this identity between the two products that Rem-
178. Judge Learned Hand explained the "objective theory" of contract as follows: "A con-
tract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the
parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the
parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent." Hotch-
kiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912),
afl'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). The Restatement adopts this objective theory by speaking in
terms of a "manifestation of assent." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 18-23
(1981).
179. See, e.g., TERESA M. AMABILE, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY (1983); Daniel
Goleman, A New Index Illuminates the Creative Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1988, at C1.
180. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Society, Culture, and Person: A Systems View of Creativ-
ity, in THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 94, at 325, 326.
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brandt and the forger are equally creative, or that the two paint-
ings are equally creative? If we say yes, then there is no more
point in talking about creativity.
My argument, of course, is that the paintings may be of equal
technical skill, of the same aesthetic value, but they cannot be
considered to be equal in creativity. Rembrandt's work is crea-
tive because he introduced some variations in the domain of
painting at a certain point in history, when those variations were
novel, and when they were instrumental in revising and enlarg-
ing the symbolic domain of the visual arts. The same variations
a few years later were no longer creative, because then they sim-
ply reproduced existing forms.181
The trivial/distinguishable variation standard, the other princi-
pal criterion that courts have already applied to determine Type II
originality, may provide an objective test for "creativity" that also
fits squarely within Dr. Csikszentmihalyi's, Dr. Arieti's, and per-
haps even Feist's view of creativity. Douglas Hofstadter, Pulitzer
Prize-winning professor of cognitive science, has proposed that
"variations on a theme" are the "crux of creativity. ' 18 2 Professor
Hofstadter's characterization and the views of social psychologists
who see the historical context of variation as an important compo-
nent of creativity both suggest that there is potential utility in ex-
amining the nature of an author's variations-rather than examin-
ing the networks of her subconscious-to evaluate creativity. This
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. HOFSTADTER, supra note 94, at 232-59. Professor Hofstadter is a professor of Cogni-
tive Science at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana, where he is the director of the
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition. He won the Pulitzer Prize in general non-
fiction in 1980 for his book GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979). He
wrote a regular column for Scientific American magazine from January 1981 through July
1983 and co-edited a book of philosophical lectures and essays entitled THE MIND'S I: FAN-
TASIES AND REFLECTIONS ON SELF AND SOUL (1981) with Daniel C. Dennet. Interestingly, sev-
eral other legal commentators have cited Hofstadter's work. See Clayton P. Gillette, Plebi-
scites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV.
930, 964 (1988) (agreeing with Hofstadter's assessment of cooperation in driving habits); J.
Allan Hobson, Psychiatry as Scientific Humanism: A Program Inspired by Roberto Unger's
Passion, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 791, 801 (1987) (using Godel, Escher, Bach as an example of
information theory); Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas
Luhmann, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1670 n.77 (1989) (citing Hofstadter's theory of the logic of
reflection); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 n.71 (1989) (citing Hofstadter's distinc-
tion between foreground and background in physics).
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is not to say that a trivial/distinguishable variation analysis is sim-
ple. Nevertheless, it furnishes us with a means of evaluating Type
II originality that is probably more desirable than resorting to
medical expert testimony. 183
D. Alfred Bell and Trivial/Distinguishable Variation
1. The Standard and the Problem
In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,'" the Second
Circuit provided the classic articulation of the trivial/distinguisha-
ble variation standard.15 Alfred Bell & Co. (Bell) produced repro-
ductions of public-domain paintings by old masters using a special
engraving process known as mezzotint.' Bell sued Catalda Fine
Arts (Catalda), claiming infringement of eight mezzotints. 187 Cat-
alda asserted that the mezzotints were not copyrightable because
they were merely reproductions of public domain works, and,
183. Medical experts make litigation extremely expensive and rarely make decisions
easier because both parties usually provide their own experts. See generally HAROLD L.
KLAWANS, M.D., TRIALS OF AN EXPERT WITNESS: TALES OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY AND THE LAW
(1991) (giving an autobiographical account of one doctor's experiences in courtroom
testimony).
I am certainly not the first to criticize the use of creativity as an element of copyright-
ability. See Whicher, supra note 8, at 295.
When the creative process is re-examined by the wisdom of judicial hindsight,
it is, like a conjurer's trick that has been explained to the children, almost
always a disappointment. There is, we discover, no magic to it after all. It's
only work. -Angrily we protest, "Anybody could do that!" In the map cases...
as one such disenchantment succeeded another, from case to case, the courts
were insensibly but no less surely drawn to raise their standards of creativity
even higher and higher. First outline maps, then more complex cartographical
creations, were held to be lacking in the "magic" of "creativity." Inevitably,
the initial demand for a "modicum of creative work" became, in the end, an
insistence upon that "high degree of creation" which produces something
"novel with the cartographer."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
It is quite likely, however, that Dr. Arieti's "assembly process" model of creativity would
create a lower threshold than that which the Court created in Feist.
184. 191 F.2d. 99 (2d Cir. 1951); see supra notes 17-19, 121-22 and accompanying text; see
also Olson, supra note 6, at 50-51 (discussing Alfred Bell).
185. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 99.
186. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 973, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1947),
aff'd, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
187. Id.
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therefore, lacked originality. 188 The Second Circuit held that Bell's
mezzotints were original and, therefore, copyrightable. 189
Judge Frank, writing for the appellate court, began his analysis
by stating that " '[o]riginal' in reference to a copyrighted work
means that the particular work 'owes its origin' to the 'author.' 19o
He next contrasted the copyright concept of originality with the
patent concept of novelty,' 91 quoting at length from Baker v. Sel-
den: 92 "The copyright of the book, if not pirated from other
works, would be valid without regard to the novelty, or want of
novelty, of its subject matter. The novelty of the art or thing de-
scribed or explained has nothing to do with the validity of the
copyright."' 9' Judge Frank also cited Justice Holmes' famous deci-
sion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.194 for the pro-
position that "[t]here is a very broad distinction between what is
implied in the word 'author,' found in the Constitution, and the
word 'inventor.' The latter carries an implication which excludes
the results of only ordinary skill, while nothing of this is necessa-
rily involved in the former."'95 Judge Frank explicitly recognized
that "it is possible to have a plurality of valid copyrights directed
to closely identical or even identical works.' ' 9 6 He explained this
seemingly counterintuitive proposition, stating that "none of [the
closely identical or identical works] if independently arrived at
without copying, will constitute an infringement of the copyright
of the others.' 9 7 Relying upon these venerable precedents, the
court then reached the legal conclusion that
188. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 104.
189. Id. at 105.
190. Id. at 102 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58
(1884)).
191. Id.
192. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
193. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102 (quoting Baker, 101 U.S. at 102).
194. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
195. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102 (quoting Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758, 764 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1894), cited with approval in Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250, 252).
196. Id. at 103 (quoting LEON H. ADMUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 70 (1936)).
197. Id. Judge Frank also observed that English copyright agreed: "'If it could be shown
that two precisely similar works were in fact produced wholly independently of one another,
the author of the work that was published first would have no right to restrain the publica-
tion by the other author of that author's independent and original work.'" Id. at 103 n.16
(quoting WALTER M. COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (7th ed. 1936)).
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nothing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter
be strikingly unique or novel. Accordingly, we were not ignoring
the Constitution when we stated that a "copy of something in
the public domain" will support a copyright if it is a "distin-
guishable variation"; or when we rejected the contention that
"like a patent, a copyrighted work must be not only original, but
new", adding, "That is not. . . the law as is obvious in the case
of maps or compendia, where later works will necessarily be an-
ticipated." All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution
and the [copyright] statute is that the "author" contributed
something more than a "merely trivial" variation, something
recognizably "his own." Originality in this context "means little
more than a prohibition of actual copying." No matter how poor
artistically the "author's" addition, it is enough if it be his
own.
1 98
Consequently, the court held that Bell's mezzotints were original
and copyrightable versions of the public domain paintings."' 9
Judge Frank went even further in exploring the copyrightability
of the mezzotints. He declared that "intent" was not an element of
originality, stating that Bell's variations from the old masters could
be "inadvertent, [and] the copyrights would [still] be valid. '200 "A
copyist's bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused
by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable varia-
tions. Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the 'au-
thor' may adopt it as his and copyright it." ' 0' 1 The idea in Alfred
Bell that an author's lack of intent cannot negate originality is
truly significant. If an author's lack of intent cannot negate origi-
nality, then it follows that an author's motives for creating a work
cannot nullify originality either.
198. Id. at 102-03 (first alteration in original) (footnotes and citations omitted).
199. Id. at 104.
200. Id. at 105.
201. Id. (footnotes omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 121-22. In the footnotes,
Judge Frank noted that several scientific discoveries had been accidental, and he recounted
one story, told by the Greek biographer Plutarch, of "[a] painter, enraged because he could
not depict the foam that filled a horse's mouth from champing at the bit, [who] threw a
sponge at his painting; the sponge splashed against the wall-and achieved the desired re-
sult." Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 105 n.23; see also Oppenheimer, supra note 8, at 229-31
(approving on policy grounds Judge Frank's hypothesis regarding the role of intent in copy-
right originality).
1993].
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In order to determine whether a work is Type II original using
Alfred Bell's trivial/distinguishable variation standard, a deci-
sionmaker must consider whether an author's variation is merely
trivial or whether it amounts to "something more than triv-
ial"-that is, something "distinguishable."'2 02 This analysis requires
a decisionmaker to investigate at least two submatters. First, the
author must identify for the decisionmaker the variations that the
author has made. Second, the decisionmaker must determine
whether those variations are trivial or distinguishable. If the deci-
sionmaker determines that those variations are distinguishable,
then the work is presumably Type II original. 03
2. Variations
There are an infinite number of ways to change, or vary, a work
that is fixed in a tangible medium. 0 One can enlarge or reduce the
size. One can use a different medium-for example, marble instead
of bronze. One can change the relative proportions of the physical,
material object itself, perhaps by enlarging one surface while re-
ducing another correspondingly so that the total density or surface
area remains the same as the archetype. Or, one can alter the artis-
tic embellishments on the object, turning a smiling face into a
frown, for instance, by reversing the image. One can also add or
subtract features such as color or individual elements.
It is tempting to try to classify the methods of variation into
quantitative and qualitative groups.20 5 Attempting to use such a
202. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Our modern perceptions of the nature of
variations has changed as technology has empowered us to create virtually identical copies.
See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1891; infra note 219. The court in L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder,
536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1976), explained the rationale
for excluding trivial variations from copyrightability: "To extend copyrightability to minus-
cule variations would simply put a weapon for harassment in the hands of mischievous copi-
ers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public domain work." Id. at 492; see also
Oppenheimer, supra note 8, at 221-22 ("[T]he right to copy public domain works, indirectly,
...would be virtually destroyed if copyright protection were granted to variations so trivial
that they might be overlooked and copied unintentionally, exposing the innocent copyist to
the risk of an infringement action.").
203. See Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 105.
204. See Oppenheimer, supra note 8, at 233-42.
205. One could consider quantitative variations as those changes involving the addition,
subtraction, or exchanging of features or mass. Similarly, one could consider qualitative var-
iations as those changes that involve a change in shape, form, or arrangement.
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distinction, however, would probably lead to more confusion than
understanding, because some variations, like changes in medium or
material composition, would be almost impossible to classify
satisfactorily.
It is also tempting to try to classify variations in terms of their
concrete or abstract-or tangible versus intangible-characteris-
tics. For example, a change in size is, in one sense, an abstract, or
intangible, variation. Similarly, even the shift from one medium to
another might qualify as an abstract variation because the outward
appearance of the object is virtually unchanged. Nevertheless, for
purposes of copyright law, this abstract/concrete dichotomy is illu-
sory with respect to the variations themselves. In terms of copy-
rightable works-those fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion-all variations are, by definition, concrete changes in tangible
form. That is, all variations are concrete or physical, or else they
are not variations at all. Even an enlargement or reduction is a
concrete variation because it involves either an addition or a sub-
traction of matter. 0 6 Likewise, shaping in marble instead of cast-
206. One of the most famous originality cases involving a change in scale is Alva Studios,
Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (the "Hand of God Case"). In Alva
Studios, the plaintiff copyright claimant had sculpted an exact scale model 18/2-inch rep-
lica of Rodin's 37-inch bronze, "Hand of God." Id. at 266-67. The court first recognized that
"to be entitled to copyright, the work must be original in the sense that the author has
created it by his own skill, labor and judgment without directly copying or evasively imitat-
ing the work of another." Id. at 267. The court then held that Alva Studios' reproduction
was original, noting that "[i]n a work of sculpture, this reduction requires far more than an
abridgement of a written classic; great skill and originality is called for when one seeks to
produce a scale reduction of a great work with exactitude." Id. With only these facts one
might conclude that the court held that a mere size variation was more than trivial. How-
ever, a short paragraph by the court, apparently ignored by other courts and commentators,
reveals that Alva Studios not only had reduced the size of the Rodin bronze, but it also had
brought about another variation:
The originality and distinction between the plaintiff's work and the original
also lies in the treatment of the rear side of the base. The rear side of the
original base is open; that of the plaintiff's work is closed. We find that this
difference when coupled with the skilled scaled sculpture is itself creative.
Id. Professor Nimmer's treatise states that Batlin interpreted the holding in Alva Studios
to mean that "only the 'complexity and exactitude' required in the reduction of the Rodin
justified a finding of originality, and that ordinarily a mere scale reduction does not consti-
tute originality, even though it may involve artistic skill and effort." 1 NIMMER, supra note
2, § 2.08[C][2] (quoting Batlin, 536 F.2d at 491); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 8, at
239-41 (concluding that size is not part of the "expression" of a work of art).
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ing in bronze entails a physical metamorphosis, not an abstract
one.
207
The trivial/distinguishable variation standard requires a deci-
sionmaker to separate, conceptually, the work in question from the
preexisting work or elements associated with that work. The deci-
sionmaker must isolate distinct conceptual components, determin-
ing first precisely what the author started with. In other words, he
must ascertain the bedrock-exactly what material the author
drew from in creating her own work.20 8 In cases involving compila-
tions or derivative works, this task is somewhat simpler than in
those dealing with freestanding works.209
Thus, in order to apply the trivial/distinguishable variation stan-
dard, a decisionmaker must weigh a number of factors and con-
sider a variety of abstract concepts. A decisionmaker must cata-
logue what elements an author has varied in the new work by
asking: "What has the author changed from the preexisting
materials? '210
3. Triviality: Concrete and Abstract
The word "trivial" comes from the Latin adjective trivialis,
meaning "that which is in or belongs to the crossroads. ' 211 The
word trivialis, in turn, is linked etymologically to the combination
of two other Latin words: the cardinal numeral three, tres (also
spelled tris) and the noun for "road," via.21 2 Thus, a trivia is a
place where three roads meet-a crossroad. This linguistic history
may be significant. The trivial/distinguishable variation standard
may be traceable, in part, to Justice Holmes' comment in the fa-
207. Professor Nimmer's treatise takes the position that "mere reproduction[s] of a work
of art in a different medium should not constitute the required originality, for the reason
that no one can claim to have independently evolved any particular medium." 1 NIMMER,
supra note 2, § 2.08[C][2] (footnotes omitted).
Although all variations are concrete, the concrete/abstract dichotomy is useful to assist in
determining whether a variation is trivial or distinguishable. See infra text accompanying
notes 211-34.
208. For a discussion of this identification process, see supra part II.D.
209. See supra part II.D.; infra part IV.
210. Of course those materials can be either preexisting works themselves, or merely data,
facts, or some other noncopyrightable materials. See infra part IV.
211. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2450 (1986).
212. Id.
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mous case, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.:213 "It would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustra-
tions, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. 2 1 4 Justice
Holmes' conjunctive use of two superlative adjectives, "narrowest"
and "most obvious," suggests a rigorous limitation. The word "triv-
ial" itself implies a superlative. If something is trivial, it is not
merely obvious 215 (lying in front of you in the road), but is so com-
mon as to be found at any crossroad, or in any road.21 6
In terms of evaluating variations, the concept of triviality has
two distinct meanings. Courts have not expressly recognized these
213. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
214. Id. at 251 (emphasis added); see supra note 20. Justice Holmes also stated that
"[p]ersonality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in hand-
writing, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's
alone. That something he may copyright ... " Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; see supra note
63.
215. In a recent article, I explained the word "obvious":
The word "obvious" comes from the Latin words "ob" ("in front of or in the
way of") and "via" ("road" or "way"). In Latin the adjective obvius is the
direct etymological ancestor of our English adjective "obvious." The Latin ad-
jective obvius means "that is in the way or path," "placed so as to meet," "in a
position to confront."
VerSteeg & Harrington, supra note 14, at 380 n.202 (citation omitted). In the text of that
article, I quoted the Oxford English Dictionary's definition of "obvious" as something that
is "directly in the way." Id. at 380. That article went to great lengths to explain why a
patentlike nonobviousness standard is inappropriate as a test for copyrightability. Id. at
358-74. My goal was effectively to refute the holdings in cases like Cooper v. James, 213 F.
871, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1914), and Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415, 418 (D. Mass.
1936), in which the courts used a test akin to the "skilled mechanic test" in patent law to
determine that certain musical compositions were not copyrightable because they were the
sort that could have been written by a skilled or "fairly good musician." Cooper, 213 F. at
872.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 211-12. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991), is certainly more understandable if one considers
it in terms of a trivial/distinguishable variation standard. See VerSteeg & Harrington, supra
note 14, at 379.
[I]n Feist, it would have been relatively straightforward for the Court to have
held that an alphabetical white page listing was not more than merely a trivial
variation of the facts (names and telephone numbers). The process of putting
names in alphabetical order today is no more than a trivial variation of the
names and numbers themselves.
Id. One could argue that alphabetizing at this point in human history is "so common as to
be found at any crossroad," and that any alphabetization therefore is merely trivial. See
infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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separate meanings of triviality, yet they have used both to justify
whether a variation is trivial, not only failing to choose consciously
the use of one meaning or the other, but also apparently failing to
appreciate that there are two distinctly different meanings of "triv-
ial." '217 First, a variation can be "concretely trivial" when it is very
small in terms of its concrete, or physical, manifestation.21 8 For ex-
ample, adding one additional freckle to a portrait of an already
freckle-faced redhead or adding one strand of hair to the Mona
Lisa's head would probably be considered concretely trivial varia-
tions. Similarly, increasing the curve of the Mona Lisa's "smile" by
one degree would probably be considered a concretely trivial varia-
tion. This type of minute physical variation can be considered triv-
217. One commentator has observed that courts have employed three distinct tests for
determining triviality: "One test defines a trivial change as one that is merely mechanical,
such as anyone might do." Wallace, supra note 8, at 111-12 (citing Grove Press, Inc. v.
Collector's Publications, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1967)). "A similar test defines
triviality as the exercise of only physical, as opposed to artistic, skill." Id. (citing L. Batlin &
Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857
(1976)). "A third test defines a trivial variation as one that is insubstantial." Id. (citing
Andrews v. Guenther Publishing Co., 60 F.2d 555, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1932)).
218. See National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594
(2d Cir. 1951). Judge Learned Hand described the concept of triviality in concrete terms:
There may indeed be limits to the protection that will be given to the variant
of an earlier "work," even when the variations in it are plagiarized to the last
particular. Added phrases in a written "work," or changes of a few lines or
colors in a pictorial one, may be too trivial to be noticeable by an ordinarily
attentive reader or observer; and we will assume arguendo that in such cases
the variant cannot be copyrighted.
Id. at 600. Thus, Judge Hand's formulation of the trivial/distinguishable variation standard
turns on whether the variations at issue are "noticeable by an ordinarily attentive reader or
observer." Id. The word "noticeable" suggests that, for Judge Hand, the important question
was the concrete nature of the variation, not its abstract significance. It is worth noting that
National Comics was argued on May 4, 1951, one month before Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). Also, the three-judge panel that heard National
Comics included Judge Frank, who authored the Alfred Bell opinion, and Judges Chase and
Hand; Judges Frank, Chase, and Clark heard Alfred Bell.
Professor Nimmer's treatise gives a clear example of a concretely trivial variation when
discussing the concept of originality as it applies to photographs. It suggests that, when
someone takes a photograph of a painting, drawing, or photograph, the reproduction is a
"slavish copy" and fails to contain a distinguishable variation from the archetype painting,
drawing or photograph. I NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.08[EI[1]. Clearly the photograph would
contain some very small variation from the original work, but that variation would be so
small that it would be considered trivial. This example apparently assumes that the second
photograph is a direct reproduction with no room for a photographer to select lighting or
camera angle-the four corners of the photograph mimic the four corners of the archetype.
850
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ial because the change in concrete, physical appearance is ex-
tremely slight or almost imperceptible.21
On the other hand, a variation can be "abstractly trivial." A
decisionmaker might base her characterization of a variation as
trivial on some intangible or abstract judgment regarding the work
in question, rather than on the physical manifestation of the varia-
tion. There are basically two types of abstract triviality. A deci-
sionmaker could determine that a variation is abstractly trivial if
she considers the type of variation in question extremely common-
place. 220 The decisionmaker could also conclude that a variation is
219. See, e.g., Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King, Inc., 753 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1985). The
court in Sherry held that the seven variations from one of plaintiff's towel designs to the
next were "simply too trivial and insubstantial to justify copyright protection," pointing out,
inter alia, that "[tihe amount of sand beneath the tree was increased to change the impres-
sion from an island to a beach.. . . The water was lowered approximately three inches. On
[Sherry's original design] some of the palm leaves touched the water. In [Sherry's new de-
sign] they are two inches away." Id. at 1568. The court also noted that "the majority of
those distinguishing details are so minor that they are virtually unnoticeable upon a cursory
comparison of the two towels." Id.; see also National Comics, 191 F.2d at 600 ("Added
phrases in a written 'work,' or changes of a few lines or colors in a pictorial one, may be too
trivial to be noticeable by an ordinarily attentive reader or observer; and we will assume
arguendo that in such cases the variant cannot be copyrighted."); Uneeda Doll Co. v. Regent
Baby Prods. Corp., 355 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (stating in dicta the Copyright Office's
position that variations in the colors of dolls did not constitute copyrightable differences);
Hengst v. Early & Daniel Co., 59 F. Supp. 8, 10 (S.D. Ohio 1945) (holding that by varying a
table of gestation periods for a mare, cow, ewe, and sow from a vertical layout to a horizon-
tal layout, and by separating the animals into respective tables, the plaintiff had failed to
produce "the creative work necessary to sustain a copyright, as distinguished from mere
copying").
The technological advances in copying during the latter 20th century are staggering. See
supra note 202. Photocopying and electronic copying are faster and more accurate than the
manual copying of the Middle Ages by a factor, literally, of the speed of light. It is under-
standable that a 19th-century judge or even one from the early 20th century, who could not
imagine copying with the speed or accuracy of today's methods, would have a different sense
of what was trivial. Before the advent of modem copying technology, judges probably saw
little significance in the types of variations produced by manual copying. Indeed, Posner
and Landes have recognized that "because modern technology has reduced the time it takes
to make copies as well as enabled more perfect copies to be made at low cost, the need for
copyright protection has increased over time." Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 330. Such
a state of affairs suggests that the advent of new copying technology has brought with it a
need for an extremely low threshold of copyrightability, and consequently, a concomitantly
low threshold of originality.
220. The alphabetization at issue in Feist is an example of such a commonplace variation.
Recall that the Court in Feist characterized Feist's alphabetization as "mechanical," "en-
tirely typical," "garden-variety," "obvious," "basic information," "mere selection," "an age-
old practice, firmly rooted in tradition," "so commonplace as to be expected as a matter of
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abstractly trivial if she believes that the author's reasons for bring-
ing about that variation are insubstantial.22' Of these two possibili-
ties, only the first should be applicable. If Judge Frank was right
when he said that an author's absence of intent cannot negate orig-
inality,22 2 then the existence of author's intent should not negate
originality either. Because copyright law is primarily concerned
with protecting authors' expressions, not their ideas, deci-
sionmakers arguably should focus their attention on the question
of concrete triviality: the physical manifestation of the varia-
tions.223 When an author adds, subtracts, or exchanges a large
number of elements, the sheer number of those changes should
perhaps render them less likely to be considered trivial and more
likely to be considered distinguishable.224 Similarly, when an au-
course," "practically inevitable," and a "time-honored tradition." See supra text accompa-
nying notes 72, 74-78.
One commentator has discussed some of the concrete/abstract considerations discussed in
this section under the rubric of "invisible factors." Oppenheimer, supra note 8, at 225-42.
221. See infra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22, 200-01.
223. By making the concrete nature of a variation the determining factor in the trivial/
distinguishable variation inquiry, courts can avoid the subjective question of whether an
author's personality is manifest in a work. Professor Ginsburg has pointed out the problem
of the personality approach:
[T]he personality approach might exculpate variations that manifested the sec-
ond comer's personality. Under Justice Holmes's generous formulation, the
variations need not be extensive to capture the second corner's persona. In-
deed, the personality view might find more authorship in a lesser degree of
variation than would the labor approach. As a result, one might expect that a
personality basis of copyright would not expand the scope of copyright
protection.
Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1885. Similarly, a focus on the concrete nature of a variation
should help courts avoid the question of how much labor an author has expended-to the
extent that an investigation of an author's labor is relevant any longer, in the wake of Feist.
See id. at 1899.
224. What will be considered a large number will vary depending on matters such as the
size, scale, and complexity of the elements or works from which the new work has been
compiled or derived. Compare Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp.
603 (C.D. Cal. 1967), in which the court stated:
Plaintiff made approximately forty thousand changes. . . in producing its edi-
tion. These changes consisted almost entirely of elimination and addition of
punctuation, changes of spelling of certain words, elimination and addition of
quotation marks, and correction of typographical errors. These changes re-
quired no skill beyond that of a high school English student and displayed no
originality. These changes are found to be trivial.
Id. at 605.
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thor alters the physical characteristics of an archetype in an ex-
treme fashion-changing a broad smile to a disdainful frown, for
example-the extreme nature of the variation points toward a con-
clusion that the variation is distinguishable, not trivial.225 Thus, an
author's introduction of either numerous or extreme variations in
the concrete nature of preexisting works is likely to render those
variations distinguishable. 226 Arguably, a decisionmaker should
consider variations as trivial only when the number of physical
variations that the author has made is very small-that is, when
the variations are concretely trivial. Neither numerous nor large
variations, however, ought to be required in order to make a work
Type II original. If a work has only one variation, that alone could
be sufficient to elevate the work to Type II originality if the deci-
sionmaker were to conclude that that variation is not abstractly
trivial. In fact, a sliding-scale correlation must exist between con-
crete and abstract triviality. As the number or magnitude of varia-
tions increases and the changes are no longer concretely trivial, the
need for a variation to rise above abstract triviality in order to at-
tain distinguishability decreases; the reverse is also true.
One must ask at this point whether a work's variations can be
concretely trivial but, nevertheless, abstractly distinguishable and
therefore original for purposes of copyrightability? The answer is
probably "No." One could argue that, although a variation may ap-
pear small or insignificant,227 if an author can logically justify her
225. Conceivably, this is the type of variation that the court in West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987),
found to be distinguishable. In West, West sued Mead Data Central alleging copyright in-
fringement in Mead's proposed use of West's arrangement and pagination of legal reports.
Id. West's arrangement process clearly involved substantially altering the raw data-the
cases themselves. Id. at 1222. See infra part III.E.1 for additional discussion on this point.
226. This analysis suggests that judges ought actually to count the number and also as-
sess the magnitude or scope of the author's variations. In a recent decision, a New Hamp-
shire bankruptcy court held that when a licensee changed thousands of lines of source code
to debug a software program, made the display and controls more user friendly, changed the
import function, and altered the report customization and communications message ex-
change, those variations were not trivial because they required independent judgment and
created something that was recognizably the licensee's own. C Tek Software, Inc. v. New
York State Business Venture Partnership, 127 B.R. 501 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991). Thus, the
licensee had created an original derivative work that was copyrightable on its own. Id.
227. A variation may appear insignificant for a number of reasons. For example, in cases
in which the author has made only one or two changes, the small number of changes may
make those variations appear trivial. In cases in which an'author has made a minor change
1993]
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change, her explanation should be sufficient to convince the deci-
sionmaker that the variation is distinguishable for abstract rea-
sons. In such an instance, however, a decisionmaker would be using
an author's motivation or intent to assess the existence of original-
ity. Judge Frank's opinion in Alfred Bell22 and Judge Meskill's
dissent in Batlinss9 indicate that such considerations ought to be
irrelevant in determining originality. It is possible, however, to ar-
gue that in Alfred Bell, Judge Frank did not say that state of mind
was irrelevant to the question of originality and copyrightability;
he merely said that an absence of intent did not destroy original-
ity.30 Furthermore, given that society is often slow to appreciate
artistic variation,23 ' it would serve copyright policy's interest in
promoting authors' innovations to permit authors, in close cases, to
obtain copyrights if they can demonstrate why their seemingly
small concrete variations are abstractly distinguishable by explain-
ing their reasons for making the variations.
such as curving an eyelash on a portrait when the initial picture had a straight eyelash, the
variation appears trivial. In Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945),
Judge Frank, who would author the opinion in Alfred Bell six years later, speculated about
the potential copyrightability of minute concrete variations and the effect of intent, in-
creased value, and the perception of "add[ed] distinctiveness." Id. at 513. Judge Frank
wrote:
[P]laintiff's copy contains some inadvertent defects in shading, adding nothing
to its worth in any conceivable way and so minute as to escape the attention of
the ordinary observer. If one made an unintentional error in copying which he
perceived to add distinctiveness to the product, he might perhaps obtain a
valid copyright on his copy, although the question would then arise, whether
originality is precluded by lack of intention. That question we need not
consider.
Id. In a footnote, Judge Frank suggested that "intent" was unnecessary because "lilt is not
easy to ascertain what is intended and what inadvertent in the work of genius: That a man
is color blind may make him a master of black and white art; a painter's unique distortions,
hailed as a sign of his genius, may be due to defective muscles." Id. n.4. As has been noted,
he echoed his distrust of "intent" as an element of originality in Alfred Bell, stating that
even variations that were "inadvertent" were copyrightable. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catlada
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951); see supra text accompanying notes 121-22,
200-01.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22, 200-01.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 280-82.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22, 200-01.
231. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.; 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903); supra
note 20.
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On the other hand, allowing decisionmakers to consider an au-
thor's reasons for making a variation as evidence for validating
originality would invite fraudulent testimony by authors. It would
also be manifestly inconsistent, on the one hand, to permit an au-
thor to use her reasons for making variations in an effort to vali-
date originality but, on the other, to prohibit a defendant from us-
ing an author's reasons in an effort to negate originality. 32
This is, however, certainly not an easy issue. And difficult ques-
tions remain as to whether an author's motives can ever be a rele-
vant factor in copyrightability. Clearly, in any originality analysis
decisionmakers should always keep in mind the tenuous nature of
considering an author's motives. For example, if an author were to
arrange five public-domain works of art in a particular order, be-
lieving that that order represented a new understanding in the de-
velopment of art, would the originality of the arrangement be jeop-
ardized if the author's theory later proved incorrect? What if the
author has no reason whatsoever for her arrangement? Suppose
someone takes Shakespeare's sonnets, cuts them out of a book,
throws them from the top of a building, and then gathers them in
random order on the sidewalk below? Is that ordering more trivial
and less distinguishable than if she had arranged the sonnets in
the same order after painstaking analysis in an effort to reveal
some new correlation theme in the sonnets? 23 3
Such questions are not easily answered. Nevertheless, one can
argue that only after a decisionmaker first determines that a
work's variations are concretely trivial-that the number and/or
232. In addition to the logical inconsistencies that such an approach would entail, there
would be far too many practical problems. How would a decisionmaker decide whether an
author's reasons were sufficient for finding a distinguishable variation? Would he consider
the variation's economic value, artistic value, or scholarly value? Such factors are probably
too subjective to assist a decisionmaker in any meaningful way.
233. Perhaps the arrangement of sonnets that is created by throwing them off of the
building is original simply because the author/thrower adopts the arrangement, as Judge
Frank suggested in Alfred Bell. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22, 200-01; cf. Key
Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.
1991) ("Selection implies the exercise of judgment in choosing which facts from a given
body of data to include in a compilation.") (emphasis added). Query also the implications of
computer-generated works.
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scale of the variations is/are extremely small-should she even
consider evaluating whether the variations are abstractly trivial.234
E. Case Studies
Three cases, consisting of one compilation case, one derivative-
work case, and one freestanding-work case, serve as helpful points
of departure to illustrate, first, the rigorous analysis necessary to
determine Type II originality using a trivial/distinguishable varia-
tion standard and, second, the practical utility of that analysis:
234. It is axiomatic in copyright law that only an author's expression is copyrightable. In
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), the United States Supreme Court held that copyright
law protects an author's descriptions of an idea but not the idea itself. Id. at 103-04
("[T]heir essence consists only in their statement. This alone is what is secured by the copy-
right."). This principle is now codified in the Copyright Act, which provides: "In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (1988).
Countless cases and articles have discussed the idea-expression problem. See, e.g., Whelan
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252-54
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods.,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1971); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 140, 141 (N.D. Ill.
1988); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.3; LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 2.12; 1 NIMMER, supra note
2, § 2.03[D]; Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expres-
sion Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175 (1990);
Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REv. 321
(1989). After all, if only an expression is copyrightable, it is somewhat counterintuitive to
hold that a nonexpressive factor-such as reasons for making a variation-can render a
work uncopyrightable. Yet copyright occasionally does just this type of thing-using nonex-
pressive factors to negate copyrightability. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 105 (denying copyright pro-
tection for works created by U.S. Government employees).
My discussion here agrees with Judge Meskill's dissenting opinion in L. Batlin & Son, Inc.
v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492-94 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (Meskill, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 857 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 278-83.
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West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc.,23 5 L. Batlin &
Son, Inc. v. Snyder,2 36 and Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co. 237
1. Compilations: West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data
Central, Inc.
In West, the Eighth Circuit held that Mead Data's star-pagina-
tion feature on LEXIS would infringe the copyright in West's case
reporters.3 8 Mead argued that West could not own the copyright
interest in page numbers.239 The court, however, insisted that "an
arrangement of opinions in a case reporter, no less than a compila-
tion and arrangement of Shakespeare's sonnets, can qualify for
235. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). Of the three cases
that I examine in this section, this is the only one that my analysis tends to support. For a
compilation case that my analysis does not endorse, see, e.g., Financial Information, Inc. v.
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986). Financial Information pub-
lished a "Financial Daly Card Service" that it alleged Moody's copied. Id. at 205-06. The
Daily Bond Cards consisted of packets of four-inch by six-inch index cards on which Finan-
cial Information printed information regarding municipal bonds. Id. at 205. The information
on the index cards typically included the identity of the issuing authority, the series of
bonds being called, the date and price of the redemption, and the name of the trustee or
paying agent. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the informa-
tion on the cards left no room for selection, choices, or judgment. Id. Judge Oakes, the
author of the district court opinion, also authored the majority opinion in Batlin. Accord-
ingly, the Second Circuit held that the Daily Bond Cards were not sufficiently original to
merit copyright protection. Id. at 205, 207-08 ("The researchers had five facts to fill in on
each card-nothing more, nothing less.").
236. 536 F.2d 486.
237. 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986). Some might argue that Toro is a compilation case, not
a freestanding-works case. Although Toro's catalogue of part numbers shares some similari-
ties with directories, Toro was responsible for creating all of the numbers and had no re-
strictions about how many digits it could employ. See id. at 1210.
238. Mead Data "developed, owns, and operates LEXIS, a computer-assisted, on-line le-
gal research service first marketed in 1973. LEXIS, like West's National Reporter System,
reports the decisions of state and federal courts." West, 799 F.2d at 1222. At the time Mead
first proposed star pagination, Mead intended to
insert page numbers from West's National Reporter System publications into
the body of LEXIS reports, providing "jump" or "pinpoint" citations to the
location in West's reporter of the material viewed on LEXIS. Thus, with the
LEXIS Star Pagination Feature, LEXIS users would be able to determine the
West page number corresponding to the portion of an opinion viewed on
LEXIS without ever physically referring to the West publication in which the
opinion appears.
Id.
239. Id. at 1223, 1225.
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copyright protection."'24 The court cited Callaghan v. Myers2 41 for
the proposition that "an original arrangement of opinions is copy-
rightable whenever it is the product of labor, talent, or judg-
ment. 2 42 The Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 243 has clearly negated that conclu-
sion to the extent that it relies on the labor involved.244 Both talent
and judgment, however, are capable of producing an arrangement
that is more than a trivial variation of cases, facts, or data them-
selves. In order to ascertain whether a compilation meets the re-
quirement of Type II originality, the decisionmaker must deter-
mine that the author's selection, coordination, or arrangement (i.e.,
the author's variation) of the preexisting elements or works is a
distinguishable variation of the elements or works as they had ex-
isted prior to the author's selection, coordination, or arrangement
(i.e., the elements or works in their unselected, uncoordinated, or
unarranged state).245
240. Id. at 1224.
241. 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
242. West, 799 F.2d at 1224 (citing Calaghan, 128 U.S. at 646-47).
243. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
244. Feist expressly overruled the "sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection" doc-
trine. Id. at 1295. For years, the "sweat of the brow" doctrine had provided a safe copyright
harbor for protecting compilations on the theory that the author's effort in gathering infor-
mation was sufficient to render the work copyrightable. See id. at 1291 (citing Jeweler's
Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259
U.S. 581 (1922), as the classic statement of the doctrine); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91
F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.2.1.3; LEAFFER, supra note 2, §
2.11[B]; 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04.
245. In Feist, the Court framed the issue as whether the plaintiff "selected, coordinated,
or arranged these uncopyrightable facts in an original way." Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296. This
approach is useful in explaining many compilation cases in which the principal issue is
whether the plaintiff's variations are trivial or distinguishable. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associ-
ated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936
F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984); Adven-
tures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942); Dow Jones &
Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Commentators are mixed in their
assessment of how useful selection, coordination, and arrangement are in evaluating origi-
nality. Compare Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1889 ("[I]n many instances, personal authorship
could be found in the arrangement of the work's components, or in their selection.") (foot-
notes omitted) with Klepper, supra note 8, at 477 (discussing the now-defunct "sweat of the
brow" doctrine and stating bluntly that "[w]hat the copyright law seeks to protect in factual
works is not an individual's creative concept so much as his or her expenditure of money
and labor"). Professor Raskind also has expressed his disenchantment with the prospect
that traditional notions of authorship and originality can assist decisionmaking in the wake
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Applying the trivial/distinguishable variation standard to the
West case requires one to ascertain precisely what the court
thought was original about West's reporters. Apparently, West
does select its cases to a certain degree. Although courts simply
mail copies of all opinions to West, West does not publish all of
them. West editors, to a certain extent, choose the cases that go
into its reporters. 4 " Regarding coordination and arrangement,
West, as a general rule, places the cases into its reporters in the
order that it receives and processes them. Thus, West's coordina-
tion and arrangement of cases results from a combination of chro-
nology and the random production process, because it can print a
given case only after the editors have completed their work on it.
However, in addition to this chronological and random ordering,
West also arranges cases geographically in its unique reporter sys-
tem of Regional Reporters.247 West also arranges some cases topi-
of new technologies: "Reliance upon such constructs as 'arrangement,' 'collection,' and 'look
and feel,' fails to illuminate basic copyright concerns of describing and identifying works of
protectible creative effort." Raskind, supra note 8, at 126.
246. Telephone Conversation with Joseph M. Musilek, Attorney for West Publishing Co.
(Mar. 26, 1992). Musilek confirmed that West's editors exercise "quite a bit of selection." Id.
He said that "there is individual selection in virtually every Reporter." Id. He did mention
that West editors were less likely to reject a case for publication when it comes from a
comparatively high-standing court, such as the U.S. Supreme Court or the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal. Id.
At the beginning of his opinion in West, Judge Arnold explained West's National Re-
porter System as follows:
For more than a century, West has been compiling and reporting opinions of
state and federal courts. West publishes these opinions in a series of books
known as the "National Reporter System." Before it publishes an opinion,
West checks the accuracy of case and statutory citations in the opinion and
adds parallel citations, prepares headnotes and a synopsis for the opinion, and
arranges the opinion in West's style and format. West then assigns its report of
each opinion to one of the individual series in the National Reporter System,
such as Federal Reporter, Second Series, or Bankruptcy Reporter; this assign-
ment is based on the court and/or subject matter of the opinion. Next, West
assigns the case to a volume in the series, further categorizes and arranges the
cases within the volume, and prepares additional materials, such as indices and
tables of cases, for each volume. Volumes and pages are numbered sequentially
to facilitate precise reference to West reports; citing the proper volume num-
ber, series name, and page number communicates the exact location of a West
report, or a portion thereof, within the National Reporter system.
West, 799 F.2d at 1221-22.
247. Later in the opinion, Judge Arnold went into greater detail about West's contribu-
tion to the cases:
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cally in volumes such as the Bankruptcy Reporter and Federal
Rules Decisions. 248 Furthermore, the company arranges some cases
hierarchically based upon which court renders the decision. For ex-
ample, the Federal Supplement contains cases decided by federal
district courts, whereas the Federal Reporter contains cases de-
cided by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal. Hence, using a trivial/
distinguishable variation analysis, the court in West could have
identified as concretely distinguishable variations any number of
facets of West's selection, coordination, or arrangement of cases for
its reporters. By selecting only cases that it deemed worthwhile,
the West editors varied in a distinguishable way the totality of
cases that they received.2 49 Arguably, West's geographical, topical,
and hierarchical arrangement of cases also are concretely distin-
guishable variations of the cases themselves. One could even argue
that the admixture of chronological and random arrangement con-
stitutes a variation that is more than trivial.2 50 This is not to say
West publishes opinions not just from one court, but from every state and all
the federal courts in the United States. As it collects these opinions, West sep-
arates the decisions of state courts from federal-court decisions. West further
divides the federal opinions and the state opinions and then assigns them to
the appropriate West reporter series. State court decisions are divided by geo-
graphic region and assigned to West's corresponding regional reporter. Federal
decisions are first divided by the level of the court they come from into district
court decisions, court of appeals decisions, and Supreme Court decisions; Court
of Claims and military court decisions are also separated out. Before being as-
signed to a reporter, district court decisions are subdivided according to sub-
ject matter into bankruptcy decisions, federal rules decisions, and decisions on
other topics. After an opinion is assigned to a reporter, it is assigned to a vol-
ume of the reporter and then arranged within the volume.
West, 799 F.2d at 1226.
248. See id.
249. See supra note 233; see also Eckes, 736 F.2d at 862-63 (stating that baseball card
companies "exercised selection, creativity, and judgment" in choosing cards to list in price
guides).
250. For a more detailed discussion of random arrangements, see infra part III.E.3. Un-
doubtedly, the Court's holding in Feist eviscerates the possibility of alphabetical arrange-
ments being original. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1297
(1991); see supra text accompanying notes 46-83. Perhaps chronological or sequential ar-
rangements are sufficiently original under Feist, since reasonable minds can differ as to
what constitutes the "right" chronology or sequence in this case, as opposed to an arrange-
ment dictated by alphabetical order. Perhaps some chronological or sequential arrange-
ments could be considered abstractly trivial, for example, when the dates appear on the face
of the documents. See William Patry, Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why the
"White Pages" are not Copyrightable), COMM. & L., Dec. 1990, at 37, 60 (stating that an
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that the court necessarily decided West correctly. 1 Rather, this
analysis simply offers a more palatable and plausible explanation
of why West's reporters might be considered Type II original.
2. Derivative Works: L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder 52 involved two companies that
produced and sold mechanical Uncle Sam coin banks on the eve of
America's Bicentennial.153 The defendant, Snyder, had seen old
cast metal versions of these Uncle Sam banks. The design of these
cast metal banks, initially produced in the nineteenth century, was
admittedly in the public domain by the time of the lawsuit. 54 Sny-
der travelled to Hong Kong in 1974 and commissioned a company
to produce a derivative plastic version of the cast metal bank.255
Once the Hong Kong manufacturer began producing these new
plastic reproductions, Snyder then registered the copyright to the
new bank.256 He also recorded the copyright registration with the
U.S. Customs Service. 57 Meanwhile, the plaintiff, Batlin, had be-
arrangement "refers to the ordering or grouping of data into lists or categories that go be-
yond the mere mechanical grouping of data as such, for example, the alphabetical, chrono-
logical, or sequential listings of data") (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR RE-
GISTRATION OF FAcT-BASED COMPILATIONS 1 (Rev. Oct. 11, 1989)).
251. See generally Dahl, supra note 8, at 732-33 (criticizing the analysis and result in
West); Patterson & Joyce, supra note 5, at 725-26 (asserting that the scope of copyright
protection authorized in West is too broad to constitute "sound policy").
252. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
253. The court described the "basic delightful design" of the Uncle Sam coin bank:
[U]ncle Sam, dressed in his usual stove pipe hat, blue full dress coat, starred
vest and red and white striped trousers, and leaning on his umbrella, stands on
a four- or five-inch wide base, on which sits his carpet bag. A coin.may be
placed in Uncle Sam's extended hand. When a lever is pressed, the arm lowers,
and the coin falls into the bag, when Uncle Sam's whiskers move up and down.
The base has an embossed American eagle on it with the words "Uncle Sam"
on streamers above it, as well as the word "Bank" on each side.
Id. at 488.
254. Id. at 488-89.
255. Id. at 488.
256. Id.
257. The court did-not specifically mention when Snyder recorded his copyright registra-
tion with U.S. Customs, but "[b]eginning in April, 1975, Batlin was notified by the United
States Customs Service that the plastic banks it was receiving were covered by appellants'
copyright. In addition, the Customs Service was also refusing entry to cast banks previously
ordered." Id.
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gun ordering cast iron Uncle Sam banks from Taiwan.2 58 Subse-
quently, Batlin saw Snyder's plastic versions ("which he consid-
ered 'an almost identical copy' of the cast iron bank") and, liking
the idea of the plastic replicas, "ordered plastic copies also."2 59
Shortly thereafter, customs officials notified Batlin that the plastic
banks Batlin had ordered were covered by Snyder's copyright.260
Furthermore, apparently also pursuant to Snyder's copyright regis-
tration and recordation, customs officials were "refusing entry to
cast iron banks previously ordered."2 61
Responding to this dilemma, Batlin sued Snyder, asking for, in-
ter alia, a declaratory judgment that Snyder's copyright was inva-
lid.262 The district court granted Batlin's request for a preliminary
injunction and the Second Circuit affirmed,263 holding "that there
was 'little probability' that appellants' copyright '[would] be found
valid in the trial on the merits' on the basis that any variations
between appellants' copyrighted plastic bank and a cast iron bank
in the public domain were merely 'trivial,' and hence appellants'
bank [was] insufficiently 'original' to support a copyright."2 64
The decisionmaker, in deciding whether a derivative work meets
the test of Type II originality using the trivial/distinguishable vari-
The Copyright Act today prohibits the importation of goods that infringe the rights of a
U.S. copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. §§ 602-603 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See generally 1 GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 2, § 5.5.2 (noting that § 602 differentiates between "piratical" goods made
without permission of the copyright owner and "gray market" goods, which violate the
terms of a territorial agreement with the copyright owner, and that only the importation of
the former is prohibited); LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 12.9[A] (describing the procedures for
obtaining protection from infringing importation); 3 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 15.04 (discuss-
ing the penalties for wrongful importation).
258. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 488.
259. Id.
260. Id.; see supra note 257.
261. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 488 (emphasis added).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 488, 492. The procedural posture of this case probably had a significant effect
on its outcome. See supra note 24. Had the court simply ruled that the defendant's banks
did not infringe Batlin's copyright, the court could have avoided obscuring the meaning of
originality. As Professor Olson points out, "The defendant [would have] remained free to
mass produce banks from its own reproduction molds. The plaintiff's copyright would have
been as minimal as the variations introduced to the Uncle Sam bank by his plastic molding
technician." Olson, supra note 6, at 55.
264. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 487 (quoting L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 394 F. Supp. 1389,
1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857
(1976)).
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ation standard, must determine whether the author's recasting,
transforming, or adapting was something more than trivial. In
other words, one must ask three distinct questions: 1) has the au-
thor altered the preexisting works in a manner more than trivial?;
2) has the author added something more than trivial to the preex-
isting works?; and 3) has the author deleted from the works some-
thing more than trivial?
In changing from a metal medium to plastic, Snyder changed the
design in a number of distinct ways. He shortened the figure of
Uncle Sam from eleven inches to nine.265 He shortened and nar-
rowed the base on which Uncle Sam stood.2 66 He changed "the
shape of the carpetbag and ... include[d] the umbrella in a one-
piece mold for the Uncle Sam figure. 2 67 Snyder also claimed to
have effected differences "in a number of other very minute de-
tails. '268 Specifically, the Second Circuit noted that, according to
Snyder: the carpetbag's shape was "rough" in the metal version
but "smooth" in Snyder's version; the base of the bag, somewhat
wide in the metal version, was narrower in Snyder's version; and
the eagle grasped arrows in his talons in the metal version but was
clutching leaves in the plastic version.269 In addition, the court
mentioned that Snyder alleged that he changed "[t]he shape of
Uncle Sam's face," "the shape and texture of [his] hat[]," "[t]he
texture of the clothing, the hairline, shape of the bow tie[] and of
the shirt collar and left arm as well as the flag carrying the name
on the base of the statue . . . along with the shape and texture of
the eagle[] on the side. '270
To support its view that the differences between Snyder's plastic
version and the cast iron public domain Uncle Sam were trivial,
the court in Batlin emphasized that Snyder's reasons for the varia-
tions were mostly matters of economic convenience. Judge Oakes,
writing for the majority, stressed that Snyder's motivation for
changing the medium from metal to plastic and his reason for re-
ducing the height was "to fit into the required price range and
265. Id. at 488.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 489.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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quality and quantity of material to be used."' 27 1 He furthermore
stated that the reason Snyder had attached the umbrella to the
base, instead of allowing it to hang loose, was to avoid the struc-
tural problem a loose umbrella might cause, as well as problems
inherent in a separate molding process. 27 1 Similarly, Judge Oakes
noted that Snyder's eagle grasped leaves instead of arrows (as the
bird had done in the cast bank) because "the arrows did not
reproduce well in plastic on a smaller size. '273 He concluded, there-
fore, that Snyder's variations were purely "functional" because
they were implemented for the "purpose .. .of making a more
suitable (and probably less expensive) figure in the plastic
medium." 27 4
By focusing on the reasons for the variations, Judge Oakes thus
relied upon abstract considerations of the trivial/distinguishable
variation inquiry. To be sure, abstract considerations are not per
se impermissible.2 15 The Court in Feist, for example, actually fo-
cused on abstract considerations-the extremely commonplace na-
ture of alphabetization. 27 However, an author's reason, purpose, or
intent is an entirely different type of abstract consideration. Judge
Oakes' fixation with the underlying purposes that motivated
Snyder's changes was critical because of the nature of the varia-
tions that Snyder actually brought about. Snyder reshaped some
existing features of the public-domain cast bank and also added
other features to it. For example, the addition and subtraction of
discrete elements, the change of the material of manufacture from
cast iron to plastic, and the reduction of size from eleven to nine
inches constituted variations. The change in Uncle Sam's face, the
shape and texture of his hat, the shape and texture of his clothing,
hairline, bowtie, shirt, collar, left arm, flag, and the eagle consti-
tuted variations. In deciding whether Snyder's variations were triv-
ial or distinguishable, Judge Oakes neither tallied their number
nor assessed their magnitude. He apparently failed to appreciate
the concrete nature of the variations. Instead, he evaluated the ab-
271. Id. at 488.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 489.
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 216, 220-22 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 72, 220 and accompanying text.
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stract nature of the variations, examining Snyder's reasons for
making the variations. In other words, he chose to judge the merit
of the variations as a basis for deciding whether they were trivial.
Hence, he was not considering the number or scale of the varia-
tions but rather the author's motives in bringing about those varia-
tions. Judge Oakes' decision rested, at least in part, on his assess-
ment that Snyder's variations were abstractly trivial; they were
not, however, abstractly trivial in the Feist sense.2
In dissent, Judge Meskill made it clear that he considered the
plaintiff's variations to be concretely distinguishable: "The inde-
pendent sculpting of the mold and the aggregated differences in
size and conformation of the figurine should satisfy this [trivial/
distinguishable variation] standard. '278 He continued, noting: "The
most obvious differences between the two exhibits in this case are
the size and medium. While these factors alone may not be suffi-
cient to render the work copyrightable, they surely may be consid-
ered along with the other variations. ' 27 9 Later, Judge Meskill
stressed:
The primary variations between the two banks involve height;
medium; anatomical proportions of the Uncle Sam figure, in-
277. One commentator has criticized this holding, noting that
[t]he suggestion that commercial or "functional" motivations may be fatal to
an art reproduction's prospects for copyright protection appears to conflict
with the holding of Mazer v. Stein [347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954)]. In that case the
Supreme Court rejected a similar contention in holding that when an artist
becomes a designer for a manufacturer, he does not lose the protection of copy-
right for his work. While Mazer dealt with works of art as a whole rather than
"variations," its reasoning seems equally applicable in both contexts.
Oppenheimer, supra note 8, at 232. Professor Olson also criticized this decision, remarking
that "in distinguishing between variations introduced on the basis of the underlying motiva-
tion, the Batlin court is propounding a massively subjective test." Olson, supra note 6, at
55.
Possibly, though, Batlin reflects the court's concern that the idea and expression of an
Uncle Sam bank had merged. See supra note 234. Besides, if Snyder's variations were the
result of the manufacturing process-the conversion of a metal bank into a plastic one-the
court was perhaps concerned that copyright protection for Snyder's bank would indirectly
monopolize the making of any plastic Uncle Sam bank. Cf. In re Morton-Norwich Prods.,
Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (discussing the importance of considering the
manufacturing process as one aspect of "functionality" when determining whether an object
should receive trademark protection).
278. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 492 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
279. Id. at 493.
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cluding shape and expression of face; design of the clothing (hat,
tie, shirt, collar, trousers); detail around the eagle figure on the
platform; placement of the umbrella; and the shape and texture
of the satchel. Granting Snyder a copyright protecting these var-
iations would ensure only that no one could copy his particular
version of the bank now in the public doniain, i.e., protection
from someone using Snyder's figurine to slavishly copy and
make a mold.280
He also chastised the majority opinion for considering the artist's
variations trivial on account of the reasons for the variations:
"[T]he author's reasons for making changes should be irrelevant to
a determination of whether the differences are trivial."'281 He cited
Alfred Bell for the proposition that "even an inadvertent variation
can form the basis of a valid copyright. ' 282 Professor Ginsburg has
also taken the position that "[i]nquiry into the personal or subjec-
tive character of the author's efforts would seem irrelevant to the
work's copyrightability. ' '28 3 Judge Meskill's dissent in Batlin actu-
ally demonstrated why an author's reasons ought to be irrelevant
when the variations in question are concretely distinguishable. A
decisionmaker's determination that an author's variations are con-
cretely distinguishable should foreclose an investigation into an au-
thor's reasons for making variations in an effort to negate
originality.
Although an author's reasons for making variations ought not be
a valid excuse for finding abstract triviality, this does not mean
that the abstract nature of a variation's triviality or distin-
guishability should be wholly irrelevant. Feist, therefore, is proba-
bly a sound decision; the Court held, essentially, that alphabetiza-
tion is trivial.2" 4 Alphabetization probably should be considered
280. Id. at 493-94.
281. Id. at 493.
282. Id. (citing Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir.
1951)); see supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Frank's opinion in
Alfred Bell regarding inadvertent variations); supra text accompanying notes 121-22. Pro-
fessor Olson recognized this flaw in the Batlin majority opinion as well: "[A]s Alfred Bell
permitted even inadvertent variations to be protectable, the plaintiff's reasons for modifying
the public domain work-whether aesthetic or functional-should not be relied upon as the
basis for the decision." Olson, supra note 6, at 54.
283. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1876.
284. See supra notes 72, 220.
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abstractly trivial because alphabetization is trivial in the most lit-
eral sense of the word; it is the type of variation that is so com-
monplace as to be found at any crossroad.28 5
Courts must recognize one final point about Batlin. The opinion
was issued on April 12, 1976.286 The 1976 Copyright Act was signed
by President Ford on October 19, 1976287 and became effective on
January 1, 1978.288 Although Congress expressly intended to adopt
the originality standard forged by judicial decisions under the 1909
Copyright Act,28 9 this language in the legislative history was firmly
in place by 1966, long before Batin.29 ° Thus, Congress clearly did
not have Batlin in mind when it said that it intended to incorpo-
rate the originality standard that the courts had established under
the 1909 Act.2"'
3. Freestanding Works: Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co.
In Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co.,2"2 the plaintiff, Toro, manu-
factured and sold lawnmowers and similar equipment along with
replacement parts.29 3 Toro randomly assigned a five- or six-digit
number to each replacement part.9 The defendant, R & R, sold
replacement parts compatible with Toro's equipment; by manufac-
turing only the most commonly needed replacement parts, R & R
was able to charge a lower price for its replacements than Toro.2 95
R & R sold its parts through a catalogue using the same five- or
285. See supra text accompanying notes 211-16.
286. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 486.
287. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (enacted Oct. 19, 1976).
288. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988 & Supp. 1111991) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
289. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976) (repealed 1978); see supra note 6.
290. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 746-49 (1989).
291. In Reid, the Supreme Court held that cases decided after 1965-1966 (when the legis-
lative history became finalized) had no bearing whatsoever on the interpretation of Con-
gress' intent to adopt the reasoning of cases decided under the 1909 Act interpreting the
"work made for hire" provisions in the 1976 Act. Id. at 746-49; see also supra note 6 (dis-
cussing congressional intent in the 1976 Act to retain the judicial standard of originality
under the 1909 Act).
292. 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986).
293. Id. at 1210.
294. Id.
295. Id. Toro manufactured and offered a complete line of replacement parts rather than
only the most commonly needed replacement parts. Id.
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six-digit numbering system that Toro had devised.296 Toro sued
R & R for, inter alia, copyright infringement of the replacement-
part numbers.2 9 7 The Eighth Circuit-the same court that decided
West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc.2 -- held that
Toro's replacement-part numbers lacked the originality necessary
to support copyright protection.29 9 The court stressed that Toro
had assigned numbers arbitrarily and randomly, "without rhyme
or reason."300
Applying the trivial/distinguishable variation standard to free-
standing works is tricky. By definition, a freestanding work is a
compilation or derivation of preexisting materials that lacks a sub-
stantial similarity to those preexisting materials.3 0 1 A literal appli-
cation of the trivial/distinguishable variation standard would force
a decisionmaker to determine whether an author has varied those
preexisting materials in a manner that is more than merely trivial.
Such a determination is complicated because, by determining that
the work in question is a freestanding work, the decisionmaker has
already decided that it is not substantially similar to anything
else-or that if it is, the similarity is not the result of copying.
Toro's five- or six-digit part numbers were neither compilations
nor derivative works. Toro developed these part numbers from the
universe of numbers. Of course, the universe of numbers in isola-
tion is in the public domain, just as the universe of words in isola-
tion is in the public domain. Only when authors select, coordinate,
and/or arrange words or numbers do they create a copyrightable
work.
In fact, Toro did not actually construct its part numbers from
the infinite universe of numbers. Toro decided, for some undis-
closed reason, to use five or six digits instead of four, seven, or
seventeen digits. In other words, Toro selected five- or six-digit
numbers. Thus, as a mathematical proposition, Toro's decision to
use five- or six-digit sequences limited the number of series pos-
296. Id. R & R did, however, add the letter "R" at the beginning of the part number in its
catalogue. Id.
297. Id. at 1211.
298. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
299. Toro, 787 F.2d at 1210, 1212.
300. Id. at 1213.
301. See supra notes 23, 36-40 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34:801
RETHINKING ORIGINALITY
sibilities. In a five-digit sequence, there are 99,999 possible varia-
tions (assuming that Toro would not have issued 00000 as a part
number). In a six-digit sequence, there are 999,999 possible varia-
tions (once again assuming that Toro would not have assigned the
number 000000 to a part). This selection was a variation of the
universe of numbers. Similarly, Toro assigned specific numbers to
specific parts, creating a correlation between certain numbers and
certain parts; each part was assigned a specific number that corre-
sponded to only that part. This coordination or correlation was
also a variation of the universe of numbers.
The court, however, apparently ignored these variations. Toro's
decision to use five- or six-digit numbers set limits on the actual
number of variations possible for its replacement parts. Within
these numerical parameters, Toro was unable to add anything in
terms of variations. The court did note that Toro added a hyphen
to the numbers, but bluntly stated:
The random and arbitrary use of numbers in the public domain
does not evince enough originality to distinguish authorship.
The expression itself is nothing more than the public domain
numbers. There is no variation, other than the trivial hyphen, to
establish authorship. Also, it is clear that no effort or judgment
went into the selection or composition of the numbers .... We
are left, then, with the accidental marriage of a part and a
number.302
Because the court either failed to recognize or chose to ignore
the concrete nature of Toro's variations-namely, its selection of a
five- or six-digit number sequence and its coordination of those
numbers with specific parts-the court advanced to the next level
of inquiry. The court undertook an analysis of abstract triviality,
evaluating Toro's reasons for correlating the part numbers with the
parts. This, of course, was precisely what Judge Oakes had done in
Batlin.3°s Toro's reason for assigning part numbers to parts was
simple: it had assigned them arbitrarily and randomly.304 The
302. Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 271-77.
304. Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213.
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court seized upon this apparent lack of rationality and used it to
deny copyright protection for Toro's numbersY'5
I In some superficial ways, this decision is similar to the decision
in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 30 6 In
Feist, the variation at issue was also selection, coordination, and
arrangement: Rural's arrangement of names and numbers.0 The
Supreme Court in Feist essentially held that because alphabetizing
names is so commonplace, an alphabetical arrangement lacks Type
II originality based upon an abstract quality of the variation.3 0 8 In
Toro, the court held that a random coordination between part
numbers and parts lacked Type II originality based upon an ab-
stract quality of the variation because Toro's reasons for the varia-
tions were arbitrary. There is, however, a world of difference be-
tween characterizing a variation as abstractly trivial because it is
extremely commonplace, as in Feist, and doing so because the
hindsighted decisionmaker frowns upon the merit of an author's
reasons for making the variations.0 9
Given the court's stated reasoning in Toro, it is conceivable that
had Toro been able to justify its coordination, the court would
have reached a different conclusion. For example, had Toro re-
sponded that the numbers were not random, but rather corre-
sponded to a particular location on the machines or in the ware-
house, such a justification of the coordination might have produced
a different result. Once again, as was the case in Batlin, by evalu-
ating the author's reasons for making a variation rather than eval-
uating the physical manifestation of the variation itself, the court
becomes an arbiter of intrinsic value, not of expression. Perhaps
Toro is more understandable after Feist. If an alphabetical ar-
rangement can be considered an abstractly trivial variation be-
cause alphabetization is an extremely commonplace (i.e., trivialis)
variation, then maybe a random arrangement should also be con-
305. Id.
306. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); see supra part III.B.
307. See supra part III.B.
308. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296-97; see supra notes 72, 210-16, 220 and accompanying text.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 277-85.
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sidered an abstractly trivial variation because random ordering,
like alphabetization, is exceedingly routine.310
One pervasive problem flowing from applying a trivial/distin-
guishable variation standard to freestanding works is even more
troublesome than the mere isolated instance of the court's manipu-
lation of abstract considerations in Toro. As was noted, a free-
standing work, by definition, does not bear a substantial similarity
to any ascertainable archetype or preexisting materials.311 If it did,
it would be either a derivative work or a compilation. Conse-
quently, we must ask precisely by what guidelines do we judge
triviality and distinguishability. In other words, what is the appro-
priate bedrock, or starting point? What is it that the author must
have varied in a distinguishable way? Must she have contributed a
variation that is distinguishable vis-h-vis all works in the public
domain? The answer must be "No." If this were the requirement,
then a poem independently created but identical to another preex-
isting work would fail under this interpretation of the trivial/dis-
tinguishable variation standard.
One of the most famous illustrations of the doctrine of copyright
originiality, however, makes it clear that this cannot be the case. In
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 12 Judge Learned Hand
offered his proverbial example of copyright originality:
[Defendants wrongly assert that] like a patent, a copyrighted
work must be not only original, but new. That is not however
the law as is obvious in the case of maps or compendia, where
later works will necessarily be anticipated .... Borrowed the
work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not himself pro
tanto an "author"; but if by some magic a man who had never
known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn,
he would be an "author," and if he copyrighted it, others might
310. American copyright law excludes facts-no matter how original or creative-from
copyright protection because of potential anticompetitive problems. See Robert C. Denicola,
Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary
Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 516 (1981); Gorman, supra note 8, at 1570. It is possible that
the court viewed Toro's numbers merely as facts or data. Such reasoning would help to
explain the opinion but does not explain why Toro's 'numbers are unoriginal.
311. See supra notes 23, 36-38 and accompanying text.
312. 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669"(1936).
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not copy that poem, though they might of course copy
Keats's.'s
The key, then, must be Judge Hand's premise that the second au-
thor "had never known" Keats' poem. In Judge Hand's example,
the second poem is a freestanding work because the second author
was neither deriving nor compiling his ode from Keats'. Hence,
when a work is freestanding, the only plausible benchmark for
evaluating an author's variations is not all preexisting works, but
rather all preexisting works to which the author had access. "
Judge Friendly recognized the need for this consideration over
twenty years ago when he suggested that "[o]riginality sufficient
for copyright protection exists if the 'author' has introduced any
element of novelty as contrasted with the material previously
known to him. 3 15 Even this benchmark may prove to be problem-
313. Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added).
314. In Toro, the court cited Batlin for the proposition that "[i]f the disputed work is
similar to a pre-existing protected work or one in the public domain, the second work must
contain some variation recognizable as that of the second author." Toro Co. v. R & R Prods.
Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486
(2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976)). This is an overbroad reading of Bat-
lin. First, the question cannot be whether the disputed work "is similar to a pre-existing
work or one in the public domain." The threshold inquiry must be whether the disputed
work is a derivative or a compilation. Mere similarity does not make a work a derivative or a
compilation. Second, as the Ode on a Grecian Urn example illustrates, the determination of
originality cannot turn on whether an author has varied "a pre-existing work or one in the
public domain." Rather, the question must be whether the author has varied either a preex-
isting work or one in the public domain to which she had access. Landes and Posner have
criticized Hand's hypothetical because "[tihe probability of accidental duplication of Keats'
poem word for word is too small to justify courts in treating it as a litigable question, that is,
one fairly open to doubt." Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 346 n.30.
To assume a correlation between the length or substance of a work and originality is
probably more pragmatic. As the length or material substance of a work increases, the
claimant's burden of proving that she did not copy it from somewhere else also increases
correspondingly. Therefore, originality, in one sense, may be linked to quantity of expres-
sion. See generally infra part IV and especially note 336 (stating that for purposes of Type I
originality, longer works that are substantially similar to an archetype are less likely to be
independent creations).
315. Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971) (emphasis
added). Note that Judge Friendly did not use the term "novelty" in its broad, patentlike
sense, but rather restricted its meaning to contrast what the "author" introduced with what
he had previously known.
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atic;31 6 indeed, a number of its problems become evident in light of
Type I originality.
IV. TYPE I ORIGINALITY
Courts have long held that in order for a work to be original, it
cannot have been copied. 17 Defining "originality" as independent
creation is the classic and most unsullied explanation of what origi-
nality is and should be in American copyright jurisprudence. 8
Courts and commentators time and again have restated the funda-
mental position that copyright originality means independent crea-
tion and not novelty, uniqueness, or artistic merit.3 19 One court re-
cently stated this proposition in crystal-clear fashion:
It is axiomatic that the designation "original" is not intended
to be limited to works that are novel or unique. Rather the word
"original," which was "purposely left undefined" by Congress,
refers to works that have been "independently created by an au-
thor," regardless of their literary or aesthetic merit, or ingenuity,
or qualitative value.2 0
Nowhere is this basic premise better explained than in Judge
Hand's Ode on a Grecian Urn example discussed above321 in con-
nection with applying the trivial/distinguishable variation standard
to freestanding works. As was the case in that analysis, in evaluat-
ing the concept of Type I originality, one must observe Judge
316. One obvious problem is the possibility of subconscious copying. See Bright Tunes
Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd sub nom.
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
317. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991);
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1970); Wihtol v.
Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier, 16 F. Supp. 729,
731 (M.D. Pa. 1936); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.2.1; 2 id. §§ 7.1.1, 7.2.2; LEAFFER, supra
note 2, at 35 (citing cases); 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, §2.01, at 2-9 nn.12-13 (same).
318. "[T]he true test of originality is whether the production is the result of independent
labor ,or of copying." DRONE, supra note 63, at 208.
319. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954); Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's
Investors Serv., Inc. 751 F.2d 501, 507 (2d Cir. 1984); Runge v. Lee, 441 F.2d 579, 581 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887 (1971); supra note 13 and accompanying text.
320. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 1990)
(citations omitted) (holding that the menu command structure of a computer program was
copyrightable).
321. See supra notes 312-16 and accompanying text.
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Hand's premise: the second poet never saw or heard Keats' poem.
In Judge Hand's view, because the second poet had no access to
Keats' poem, the second poem was ipso facto original.322 This un-
derstanding of originality makes it clear that the second poem's
literal identity, or exact similarity, does not make it unoriginal.
Type I originality, then, means simply "uncopied. '3 23 To take
the "uncopied" requirement seriously, however, courts must genu-
inely analyze a work against all preexisting materials in order to
determine whether it was copied. 24 Courts routinely scrutinize
whether a work has been copied in copyright infringement litiga-
tion.3 25 Such scrutiny is, in fact, the heart and soul of copyright
litigation. 26 Courts are, therefore, accustomed to applying the
methods of inquiry required to determine whether a defendant has
copied a plaintiff's work. Courts are also familiar with the analysis
needed to compare a defendant's work with a plaintiff's work in
determining whether the works are "substantially similar. '327
Moreover, courts are well versed in determining whether a defend-
ant had access to a plaintiff's work. Taken seriously, determining
Type I originality should entail precisely the same analysis. A de-
fendant who attacks a plaintiff's work alleging that it lacks Type I
originality, however, ordinarily would have the burden of proving
that the plaintiff copied3 28 some other work-some archetype.32 9
322. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
323. Professor Nimmer's treatise states this tenet as follows:
Originality means only that the work owes its origin to the author, i.e., is inde-
pendently created, and not copied from other works. Therefore a work is origi-
nal and may command copyright protection even if it is completely identical
with a prior work, provided it was not copied from such prior work but is
rather a product of the independent efforts of its author.
1 NIMER, supra note 2, § 2.01[A] (footnotes omitted); see supra notes 12-13 and accompa-
nying text.
324. 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.01.
325. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 7.1.
326. See, e.g., id. § 7.1.1 ("Infringement turns strictly on proof of copying and improper
copying.").
327. See id.
328. A defendant could, of course, prove that the plaintiff copied, either by direct evi-
dence of copying, or by circumstantial evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff had access
to an archetype and that the plaintiff's work was substantially similar to that archetype. See
supra notes 24, 42.
329. The Copyright Act provides that a registration certificate, if obtained within five
years after the first publication of the work, serves as prima facie evidence of the validity of
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Unless a defendant can offer evidence showing that the plaintiff
copied her work from an archetype or can offer evidence showing
that the plaintiff had access to an archetype and that the plaintiff's
work is substantially similar to that archetype, the plaintiff's work
must be considered Type I original.330 Consequently, when the
work in question is a freestanding work, a defendant will probably
have to conduct an extensive search, hoping to locate a work that
might be the plaintiff's archetype. If a defendant does locate a pu-
tative archetype-substantially similar to the plaintiff's work-
then the defendant will still have to prove that the plaintiff had
access to that putative archetype.33' If a defendant successfully
discovers a putative archetype, the inquiry into Type I originality
becomes more complex. If the putative archetype is identical to the
plaintiff's work, as in Judge Hand's Ode on a Grecian Urn exam-
ple, it must still be considered Type I original unless the plaintiff
did, in fact, copy her work from that putative archetype.
3 2
Even if the defendant is able to convince the trier of fact that
the plaintiff copied some specific archetype in creating her work,
that fact alone does not mean that the plaintiff's work totally lacks
Type I originality. In a case in which the plaintiff's work is identi-
cal to the archetype (like the second "Keats" Ode on a Grecian
Urn) and the trier of fact is convinced that the plaintiff actually
copied her work from the archetype (unlike the second "Keats"
Ode), the plaintiff's work clearly lacks Type I originality. This sce-
nario, where the plaintiff's work is identical to an archetype and
where the trier of fact is convinced that the plaintiff copied her
work from the archetype, is the paradigmatic example of a Type I
unoriginal work.
Even if the plaintiff did copy an archetype, however, she still
might have created an original work. Unquestionably, the copied
the owner's copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988). Therefore, the burden of locating an arche-
type and proving access and substantial similarity would be on the defendant, the party-
challenging the originality of the plaintiff's work. See id. The Act provides that a court has
complete discretion to determine the weight given to a registration certificate obtained more
than five years after first publication. Id.
330. See supra note 24; supra text accompanying note 39.
331. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
332. Of course one can never be entirely certain of copying. The trier of fact must believe
by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff copied her work from the putative
archetype.
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portion' of the plaintiff's work is not Type I original, but if the
plaintiff changed the archetype in any way, such as by adding ma-
terial, subtracting material, or altering the material in the arche-
type, that change could be original.333 Hence, it is plausible to sug-
gest that it is only when an identifiable archetype exists that a
decisionmaker should address the question of whether the plain-
tiff's work contains a trivial/distinguishable variation from some
preexisting works. Thus, when the work in question is genuinely a
freestanding work, the question of whether the work contains any
trivial/distinguishable variation from any preexisting works is vir-
333. It is fair to ask whether this mode of analysis is applicable to compilation cases like
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991), and West
Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1070 (1987). See supra part III. As is the case with all compilations, Rural's telephone
directory was not completely Type I original. By definition, all compilations start with some
preexisting works of some sort. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. In this sense,
Feist's directory was a product of copying data such as names, addresses, and telephone
numbers. Those data were merely facts incapable of being copyrightable on their own. Feist,
111 S. Ct. at 1287. Rural did not dispute this point. Id. Nevertheless, as was the case in
West, Rural did arrange those elements that were, by themselves, uncopyrightable in a man-
ner that was arguably original. Id. Rural did not copy the directory's alphabetized list from
anywhere. Id. It simply applied the very old system of alphabetization to uncopyrightable
elements. Id. The conclusion is inescapable that Rural did not copy the arrangement of its
directory from any archetype. See id. at 1286. Thus, Rural's directory was Type I original
because it created the directory independently. Furthermore, Rural generated the telephone
numbers themselves (from all possible seven digit numbers-9,999,999 possible numbers,
assuming that Rural would not have assigned the number 000-0000 to a customer) and cre-
ated the correlations between the telephone numbers and the people. Id. In this respect,
Rural, like Toro, created numeral combinations and correlations. Cf. supra notes 292-310
and accompanying text (analogizing Toro's assignment of random numbers to equipment
parts to Rural's assignment of numbers to names and addresses).
Similarly, one could ask whether West copied the material in its case reporters. West, 799
F.2d at 1219. The answer is both "yes" and "no." West did not dispute that it copied the
actual cases. Id. at 1223. Consequently, West was not claiming any copyright interest in the
cases-they were not Type I original. Id. West, however, did claim that other aspects of its
reporters were not copied and were, therefore, both original and copyrightable. Id. Specifi-
cally, West's selection, arrangement, and editorial material, such as syllabi and headnotes,
were not copied. Id. At least if they were copied, neither Mead Data nor the court so much
as speculated about that possibility. Mead Data acknowledged that the editorial material
was original but implicitly disputed that West's arrangement of cases could be original. Id.
The case, however, never mentioned any putative archetype from which West might have
copied its arrangements. Thus, the arrangement of West's reporters appears to have been
Type I original.
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tually unnecessary.3 3 4 Once a putative archetype for the plaintiff's
work has been identified, there are four possibilities: 1) the plain-
tiffs work may be a compilation of archetypes; 2) it may be a de-
rivative of an archetype or archetypes; 3) it may be a slavish, po-
tentially infringing copy of an archetype; or 4) the plaintiffs work
may be a freestanding work whose similarities to the putative ar-
chetype are either coincidental or insubstantial.
In summary, the only valid way to determine whether a work is
Type I original is to ascertain first whether a putative archetype
exists. The party challenging a work's Type I originality, usually a
defendant in litigation, has the burden of identifying a putative
archetype. Once the challenging party identifies a putative arche-
type, that party must then prove that the author copied the arche-
type. Unless the challenging party can prove that the author cop-
ied her work, the work must be considered Type I original.
V. A SEMANTIC PROBLEM?: "TYPE II ORIGINALITY"
VERSUS "AUTHORSHIP" OR "WORK"
One can argue that courts have erred by requiring either creativ-
ity or a distinguishable variation as an element of originality.3 5
Once again, Judge Hand's Ode on a Grecian Urn example illus-
trates the problem. In that example, the second poem is precisely
the same as Keats'. If copyright law were to demand that a plain-
tiff's work be something more than a trivial variation of preexisting
works in addition to having been independently created, then
Judge Hand's second poet's poem would fail to be original.336
Clearly, the trivial/distinguishable variation standard seems best
suited to help resolve copyrightability questions when the work in
question is either a derivative work or a compilation.3 3 7 In those
334. Perhaps the decisionmaker should examine the author's variations in light of the
preexisting material to which the author had access. See supra notes 313-15 and accompa-
nying text. Or, perhaps he need only examine the work in question with respect to simple
shapes, forms, patterns, elements of language (such as punctuation and words), sound, mu-
sic, and the like. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
336. The second poet is, however, unlikely to have a very plausible defense of indepen-
dent creation; the longer the work, the less likely independent creation seems. See Litman,
supra note 28, at 1004-07; see also supra note 314 (arguing that the probability of Hand's
hypothetical is very small).
337. See supra parts HI.E.1-.2.
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instances, the trier of fact has initially concluded that the author
either derived or compiled her work from an archetype. When a
derivative work or compilation is at issue, the author owns a copy-
right interest only in that which the author changes, or varies. 33
8
Those variations can take the form of additions, subtractions, or
rearrangements. 39
It is helpful to illustrate this concept graphically. In the illustra-
tion below, the solid portion of the graph represents the archetype,
or foundation work upon which the work in question is based. The
shaded area represents the author's variations of the archetype, or
foundation work. It is axiomatic in copyright law that copyright
protection for a compilation or derivative attaches only to the
shaded portion of the graphic model.340 Courts have examined the
author's variations in an effort to determine whether the author's
contributions should be considered trivial or distinguishable. Pre-
sumably, the goal of the quest is to determine where the line sepa-
rating "trivial variation" from "distinguishable variation" exists.
This is the author's variation:
distinguishable :::::::....................the material contributed by the
variation ................................ author. This can be an addition,
trv......................subtraction, selection, coordination,
triviali '" " .......... . ..
variation . .=.== . .== .==arrangement, etc.
This is the archetype: the work
from which a derivative is derived,
the preexisting matter combined
for a compilation, or the pre-
existing matter to which the author
had access when she created her
freestanding work.
338. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988); see supra notes 30, 32 and accompanying text.
339. See supra part III.D.2.
340. 17 U.S.C. § 103; see supra notes 30, 32, 338 and accompanying text.
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This inquiry, however, has nothing to do with whether the au-
thor copied the variation or created it independently, the Type I
originality question. 41 Rather, this inquiry has focused most often
on the concrete nature of the author's variations and occasionally
on the abstract significance of the variations. 42 Clearly, neither the
concrete size nor the abstract significance of the variations is re-
lated to the question of independent creation or copying. Either a
work is original or it is not. I suggest that this inquiry into creativ-
ity or variations, Type II originality,343 is really an investigation
either of authorship or of whether the item under scrutiny can be
considered a work. The Copyright Act mandates that copyright
protection subsists in "original works of authorship."31" Perhaps
courts have inadvertently confused the question of originality with
the question of authorship or the existence of a work. In many in-
stances courts and commentators have used the terms "originality"
and "authorship" interchangeably.34 5 As is the case with the term
"original," nowhere have the terms "authorship" or "works" been
defined satisfactorily. 46 As the Supreme Court pointed out in
341. See supra part IV.
342. See supra parts III.D.2-.3.
343. See supra part III.
344. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (emphasis added).
345. See, e.g., Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 510 (2d
Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring). Professor Nimmer's treatise gives an example of a work
lacking originality using a trivial/distinguishable variation standard but then equates it with
authorship:
[Ain artist who makes such an exact reproduction of a Rembrandt that even
the experts cannot distinguish it from the original, undoubtedly exhibits great
skill, training, knowledge and judgment, but in failing to create a "distinguish-
able variation," he has not produced anything which "owes its origin" to him,
and hence has not engaged in an act of authorship.
1 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.01[A] (emphasis added).
In his discussion of "authorship," Professor Jaszi describes Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), not as a case about originality, but as a case
about "authorship." Jaszi, supra note 8, at 483-85,
One area of copyright law in which this authorship-originality conflation appears to hap-
pen frequently is sound recordings. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.10[A][2]; Raskind,
supra note 8, at 146.
346. Although he does not actually define "authorship," in a recent article Professor Jaszi
has provided a provocative and thorough discussion of authorship. See Jaszi, supra note 8.
He also explores the meaning of the term "work" in a copyright context. Id. at 472-80. The
Copyright Act never defines the phrase "works of authorship." Instead it gives a list of
illustrative categories:
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Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,347 "a court
should give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a stat-
ute."348 In the Copyright Act, the word "works" is a noun, "origi-
nal" is an adjective, and "of authorship" is a prepositional phrase
used as if it were the adjective "authorial" to describe or modify
"work." 49 If we were to restrict the definition of the adjective
"original" to mean "independently created," or Type I original,
such an interpretation would leave room to interpret either the
noun "work" or the prepositional phrase "of authorship" as en-
compassing the notion of distinguishable variation.3 50
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Professor Nimmer's treatise summarizes its section on "Works of Author-
ship" by concluding that "the concept 'works of authorship' is intentionally left vague under
the Act. The courts are thereby permitted, but not required, to recognize as protectable,
types of works not expressly included in the seven category enumeration." 1 NIMMER, supra
note 2, § 2.03[A]. This still leaves us with only examples of the concept but no adequate
definition of the concept.
One court, discussing authorship, first stated that a claimant's alterations to a work of
fiction "were substantial, and the finished product bears the mark of his style and crafts-
manship." Follett v. New American Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Paradoxically, the court still concluded that "these refinements are not sufficient to render
[the claimant] the principal author of the book [because] [a]uthorship connotes something
more than style, form and narrative approach. It includes a special element of creativity, of
the definition of scope and content." Id. (emphasis added); see also Litman, supra note 28,
at 1007-12 (critiquing the "romantic model of authorship," which presupposes a verifiable
distinction between "creation and copying").
347. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
348. Id. at 1294 (quoting Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461, 466 (1990)).
349. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
350. If, for example, the distinguishable-variation inquiry were used to determine author-
ship, the following definition of "works of authorship" might be a useful starting point:
1) for derivative works, a work of authorship is a work that exhibits a variation or varia-
tions from the work from which it was derived that is (are) distinguishable (i.e., more than
trivial);
2) for compilations, a work of authorship is a work that exhibits a variation or variations
from the component parts from which the compilation was compiled that is (are) distin-
guishable (i.e., more than trivial);
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Some support for this view is found in one interesting effort to
draw the dividing line between the copyrightable and the un-
copyrightable: the Code of Federal Regulations. In a section enti-
tled "Material not subject to copyright," the Regulations provide,
in part:
The following are examples of works not subject to copyright
and applications for registration of such works cannot be
entertained:
(a) Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans,
... mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or
coloring .... 351
These regulations consider all of the items mentioned as "works."
Thus, they apparently do not fail to be copyrightable because they
are not "works. 3 52 The exclusion of "[w]ords and short phrases
such as names, titles, and slogans" suggests, at the very least, that
short works that have little content fail to qualify as "works of au-
thorship." This is not because they fail to be Type I origi-
nal-indeed, they may not have been copied from archetype.
Rather, they are not copyrightable because they contribute some-
thing that is only merely trivial to that which already exists. The
exclusion of "mere variations of typographic ornamentation, letter-
ing or coloring" appears to be an attempt at codifying, at least in
part, the trivial/distinguishable variation standard with respect to
derivative works. Although far from being dispositive, these regula-
tions suggest that the concrete magnitude of an author's contribu-
tion should affect whether it can be considered copyrightable.
Magnitude apparently does not correspond to the presence of a
"work," and it definitely has no bearing on independent creation.
3) for freestanding works (i.e., works that are neither derivative works nor compilations),
a work of authorship is a work that exhibits a variation or variations from primary shapes,
forms, patterns, elements of language (such as punctuation and words), sound, music, and
the like, to which the putative author had access that is (are) distinguishable (i.e., more
than trivial).
If such a definition for "works of authorship" were adopted, an "original" work could be
defined in terms of Type I originality as: created independently, not copied from another
source.
351. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1991).
352. See supra note 346.
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Thus, perhaps it does directly relate to the existence of
"authorship."
VI. CONCLUSION
In many respects, this Article is microscopic, focusing narrowly
on a single concept-originality. On the other hand, the Article is
macroscopic because originality pervades copyright jurisprudence
with far-reaching ramifications. This examination of that lone con-
cept has revealed a number of substrata of inquiry. Courts not only
have created an originality dichotomy by splitting originality into
two subparts-Type I and Type II originality-but they have fur-
ther subdivided Type II originality into two models. One model
requires creativity and the other requires a distinguishable, as op-
posed to trivial, variation. Unless courts are cautious, the creativity
model likely will lead decisionmakers into a quagmire of expert
testimony, invoking a dependence on the gray areas of psychiatric
and psychological interpretations of gray matter.
The "trivial/distinguishable variation" model affords courts an
opportunity for something approaching an objective analysis. In
order to apply this standard, however, courts must carefully con-
sider the nature of the work-whether it is a compilation, a deriva-
tive work, or a freestanding work-and must meticulously ponder
an author's variations in terms of their concrete number, size, and
abstract significance. In terms of abstract significance, courts must
apply the Feist notion of abstract triviality, which inquires
whether a variation is extremely commonplace, and not the Batlin
notion of abstract triviality, which inquires into an author's rea-
sons for bringing about the variation. The Feist standard is quite
low, but by maintaining a low standard, judges can avoid making
value judgments about qualities of works that they may be unable
to comprehend.3 53
353. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). See also
Klepper, supra note 8, at 482, advocating a similar position with respect to the need for a
low threshold of copyrightability and the importance of viewing Type II and Type I origi-
nality as distinct modes of inquiry: "By adopting a uniformly low standard of merit, and
separating the questions of intrinsic merit and original authorship, courts would not only
avoid a source of ambiguity, but would additionally make a trial of many cases simpler and
speedier." Id.
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In sum, I recommend that in deciding whether an item is copy-
rightable, courts should consider whether that item contains some
more-than-trivial variation from the preexisting works to which
the putative author had access. Such a requirement advances Pro-
fessor-Justice Kaplan's exhortation: "[T]o make the copyright
turnstile revolve, the author should have to deposit more than a
penny in the box. 3 54 But the trivial/distinguishable variation in-
quiry might be more appealing if it were used as a measure of
whether a piece should be considered a "work of authorship"
rather than whether it is "original." Thus, decisionmakers would
not conflate and confuse the meaning of the term "original" by bi-
furcating their evaluation of originality into two distinct analyses,
one exploring Type I originality and the other testing Type II
originality
Nevertheless, whether the trivial/distinguishable variation stan-
dard is applied to determine Type II originality, "authorship," or
the existence of a "work," it is essential to consider what steps are
necessary to gauge adequately the work in question against that
standard. Therefore, a close examination of the two concepts that
comprise the standard, namely variation and triviality, is an ap-
propriate starting point. I hope that my exploration of these two
concepts improves our ability to unravel that most tangled of
threads in copyright law, originality
354. BEN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 46 (1967).
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